

# **Macro Evaluation of DFID's Policy Frame for Empowerment and Accountability**

Empowerment and Accountability Annual  
Technical Report 2016: What Works for Social  
Accountability

Final version

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## Executive summary

### Introduction

The Department for International Development (DFID) has commissioned Itad, through the e-Pact consortium, to undertake a macro evaluation of its Empowerment and Accountability (E&A) policy frame. The **main purpose** of the macro evaluation is to generate learning about what works, for whom, in what contexts and why in order to inform policy and practice in DFID and other development organisations. This report presents the findings from the second round of analysis, which focuses on social accountability (SAcc) approaches to E&A. The analysis has been conducted in the period July 2015 to February 2016. It is supported by two sets of annexes. Volume 1 provides five framing documents, including the detailed methodology and a technical note describing our approach to ensuring a robust methodology. Volume 2 contains 13 detailed project case studies selected for narrative analysis.

Social accountability comprises the range of mechanisms that informed citizens (and their organisations) use to engage in a constructive process of holding a government to account for its actions and helping it become more effective.<sup>1</sup> Proponents believe that when citizens participate in SAcc processes – whether through participatory planning or through oversight and advocacy – their views and perspectives are more likely to be heard and to influence government policies and service delivery, leading to better quality services.<sup>2</sup> Critical observers of support to SAcc have, however, flagged the dangers of an absence of strategic, higher-level support. Jonathan Fox, notably, describes an ‘accountability trap’ in which SAcc’s contribution to improved services remains localised and short-lived in the absence of strategic intervention.<sup>3</sup>

### Methodology

This macro evaluation applied a mixed-method design to generate evidence of what works, for whom, in what contexts and why. The social accountability project set analysis, presented in this report, synthesised a wide range of secondary evidence drawn from 50 DFID SAcc projects to test hypotheses and identify and interpret project contribution to change. Our approach sequenced a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) method with an in-depth narrative analysis method. The QCA identified and tested the strength of association of hypothesised ‘causal configurations’ of factors (or conditions) that were associated with a given project outcome. The interpretive narrative analysis method then examined these causal configurations in greater depth and explored how they worked in different contexts and under what conditions.

### Findings from the social accountability project set analysis

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<sup>1</sup> Malena, C. et al. (2004), ‘Social accountability: An introduction to the concept and emerging practice’, *Social Development Papers* No. 76. Washington, DC: World Bank, December.

<sup>2</sup> World Bank (2003), *World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People*. Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press.

<sup>3</sup> Fox, J. (2014), ‘Social Accountability: What does the evidence really say?’ GPSA Global Forum PowerPoint Presentation, 14 May. Available at <http://issuu.com/thegpsa/docs/social-accountability-04-13>

Through this mixed-method project set analysis of SAcc interventions we analysed three clusters of hypotheses, prioritised by DFID through collaborative discussion, under the following focus areas:

**Focus Area 1: The ‘accountability trap’.** Under this focus area, we analysed three hypotheses examining combinations of SAcc mechanisms that are predicted to be associated with improved service delivery. When considering outcomes, we distinguished between local-level (project area) service delivery and higher-level, ‘at-scale’ service delivery.

Under hypothesis 1, our analysis confirmed that translating local SAcc processes into improved service delivery at scale was difficult to achieve. The hypothesis linked two conditions – macro-level policy support with upward feeding evidence – to improved at-scale service delivery (see Section 2.1). QCA found that feeding evidence and learning into processes of higher-level legislative and policy change is neither necessary nor sufficient. Illustrative evidence from the narrative analysis suggests that the outcome can be achieved if SAcc processes are also embedded in policy or programme frameworks.

Under hypothesis 2a, we found that improved local-level (project area) service delivery is almost always achieved (see Section 2.2.). However, there was insufficient variation to assess the effectiveness of supporting formal (invited) and informal (uninvited) citizen engagement through QCA. Illustrative evidence from the narrative analysis suggests that formal (invited) citizen engagement is essential, with informal (uninvited) citizen engagement and support to skilled facilitators with close community links playing a reinforcing role. Supply-side resource and capacity constraints appear to be the main risks.

Under hypothesis 2b, QCA found that supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement is necessary to achieve improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (see Section 2.3). Illustrative evidence from the narrative analysis suggests that supporting informal (uninvited) citizen engagement, civil society networking and institutionalisation of citizen engagement can contribute.

**Focus Area 2: Socially inclusive service delivery.** Under this focus area, we addressed two hypotheses related to the question of ‘what works for whom?’ We examined strategies to reach marginalised social groups and ensure that service delivery improvements benefit them. We examined specifically the role of socially inclusive platforms and awareness raising in this process.

Under hypotheses 3 and 4, QCA found that supporting socially inclusive platforms results in improved services for marginalised groups, with awareness raising playing a supporting role (see Section 3.1). Illustrative evidence from the narrative analysis suggests that a conducive policy environment and targeted supply-side measures can be significant contributory factors in achieving improved services for marginalised groups.

**Focus Area 3: Social accountability and the social contract.** Under the third focus area, we explored three hypotheses relating to the influence of the ‘social contract’ between state and citizen on project contribution to social accountability. We explored the causes of improved formal and informal citizen engagement in SAcc relationships. We looked at the role that media engagement played in this process, in contrasting contexts of weak and strong social contracts.

Under hypothesis 5, QCA found that when state-society relations indicate a weak social contract, greater local-level responsiveness is best achieved via informal citizen action and media oversight (see Section 4.1). Illustrative evidence from the narrative analysis suggests that in some cases, formal citizen engagement can be more important than informal citizen action.

Under hypothesis 6 (6a and 6b), we considered combinations of improving citizens' knowledge of their entitlements and strengthening citizen monitoring capacity in relationship to increasing formal citizen engagement with service providers (see Section 4.2). QCA found that in the context of a weak social contract, improving citizens' knowledge of their entitlements is necessary to achieve increased formal citizen engagement with service providers. We also found a strong social contract by itself to be sufficient for the outcome to occur. Illustrative evidence from the narrative analysis adds the contributory factors of working long term through existing organisations and networks, and through a strong on-the-ground presence. In contexts of a weak social contract, supporting institutions that connect state and citizens play an important role too.

## Conclusions

We are able to synthesise our project set analysis findings into a number of operationally relevant conclusions regarding DFID's experience with social accountability interventions.

**Conclusion 1: Achieving improvements at scale.** Achieving and sustaining pro-poor service delivery at scale is extremely challenging. Only a few SAcc programmes extended the reach of SAcc processes beyond local areas bounded by geographically or administratively localised project interventions. We conclude that:

- SAcc is much more effective in achieving improved local-level (project area) service delivery than improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery
- Supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement is necessary to achieve improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery
- Illustrative evidence suggest that this is also the case for achieving improved local-level (project area) service delivery. To achieve improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery, there is illustrative evidence that supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement needs to be part of a highly institutionalised and integrated approach. On the supply side, SAcc needs to be institutionalised and embedded in policy or programme frameworks, including channels for evidence to flow upwards. On the demand side, civil society needs to be well coordinated and vertically integrated.

**Conclusion 2: Leaving no one behind.** SAcc can effectively contribute to improved services for marginalised groups. We found that supporting socially inclusive platforms resulted in improved services for marginalised groups, with awareness raising playing a supporting role. We conclude that:

- SAcc can achieve improved services for marginalised groups if socially inclusive platforms are supported
- Awareness raising can play a supporting role



- Illustrative evidence suggests that in some cases, SAcc is not sufficient and needs to be complemented by supply-side measures specifically targeting marginalised groups.

**Conclusion 3: Operating in contexts of a weak social contract.** Perhaps unsurprisingly, SAcc was found to be more effective in contexts of a strong social contract than in contexts of a weak social contract. We conclude that:

- When there is a weak social contract, greater local-level responsiveness is best achieved via informal citizen action, with media oversight playing a supporting role
- Formal citizen engagement is best increased through improving citizens' knowledge of their entitlements
- A strong social contract is by itself a strong driver of formal citizen engagement
- Illustrative evidence suggests that formal citizen engagement can be more important than informal citizen action in achieving greater local-level responsiveness. The narrative analysis also indicates that formal citizen engagement can be increased through working long term through existing organisations and networks, and through a strong on-the-ground presence,

## Recommendations

Based on these conclusions, we identify three signposts that DFID might consider as part of a 'way forward' on SAcc:

1. **Apply a strategic approach to social accountability.** Our analysis confirms the presence of local-level accountability traps as suggested by Fox (2014) and the need to move beyond tactical approaches to achieve success at scale. Localised SAcc initiatives tend to be effective but their achievements are usually limited and often unsustainable. A strategic approach to SAcc is needed for broader impacts, focussing on supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement but embedding SAcc in an approach that links the local to the national level to achieve outcomes at scale.
2. **Target marginalised groups directly to leave no one behind.** SAcc can deliver against the ambition to leave no one behind if project design specifically targets marginalised groups. In support of this targeted approach, the ambition of SAcc programmes should be to get better at identifying and designing interventions for marginalised groups, whether for locally supported SAcc or for more ambitious higher-level processes. It should then be incumbent on programme designers to be more proactive – learning from best practice, trying different mixes of activities – in finding ways to ensure that SAcc interventions leave no one behind.
3. **Consider the context, and think and work politically.** Project context influences the effectiveness of SAcc initiatives, and operational focus should be to integrate SAcc contextually. This means not only that careful context/political economy analysis is crucial when designing a SAcc initiative, but that implementation also requires thinking and working politically to adapt to changing contexts and ensure success.



## Abbreviations

BDP	Bangladesh Dalit Parishad
BHOP	Bangladesh Harijon Oikkya Parishad
CBO	Community-based Organisation
CLUF	Community Land Use Fund
CMO	Context-Mechanism-Outcome
CPH	Community Participation in Health
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAP	Drivers of Accountability Programme
DFID	Department for International Development
E&A	Empowerment and Accountability
ESMOE	Essential Steps in the Management of Obstetric and Neonatal Emergencies
FCSP	Foundation for Civil Society Programme
FHC	Facility Health Committees
FHCI	Free Health Care Initiative
HFAC	Health for all Coalition
KADP	Kenya Accountable Devolution Programme
LGA	Local Government Authority
MMR	Maternal Mortality Rate
MPRLP	Madhya Pradesh Rural Livelihoods Project
NGO	Non-governmental Organisations
PCR	Project Completion Review
PETS/SAM	Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys/Social Accountability Mechanisms
PMO	Programme Management Organisation
PPIMA	Public Policy Information Monitoring and Advocacy
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
RGCF/COPE	Rights and Governance Challenge Fund/Creating Opportunities for the Poor and Excluded (Bangladesh)
RMND	Reducing Maternal and Neonatal Deaths in Rural South Africa through the Revitalisation of Primary Health Care
RWSP	Rural Water Supply Programme (in Tanzania)
SAcc	Social Accountability
SMPMP	Strengthening Monitoring and Performance Management for the Poor (in South Africa)
ToRs	Terms of Reference
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WSDP	Water Sector Development Programme

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Background

The Department for International Development (DFID) has commissioned Itad, through the e-Pact consortium, to undertake a macro evaluation<sup>4</sup> of its Empowerment and Accountability (E&A) policy frame. The macro evaluation is being conducted over a 3-year period, from February 2014 to March 2017 and involves three rounds of analysis. This report presents the findings from the second round of analysis, which focuses on social accountability approaches to E&A. The analysis was conducted from July 2015 to February 2016.

### 1.1.1 Purpose, scope and intended use of the macro evaluation

The *main purpose* of the macro evaluation is to generate learning about what works, for whom, in what contexts and why, in order to inform policy and practice in DFID and other development organisations. As described in the terms of reference (ToRs),<sup>5</sup> it comprises two components, with the portfolio analysis (Component B) being the main focus:

- Component A: Documentation of the *results* of DFID's bilateral work in the E&A policy areas in a database (tabulated mapping), to be made publicly available;
- Component B: Analysis of DFID's *E&A Portfolio* organised in sets of projects with a common outcome to understand what does and does not work, for whom, why and in what contexts.

Our primary data is sourced from relevant documentation held on DFID's project management system. This is held on the database (Component A), compiled in an earlier phase of the evaluation, and used as the evaluation's data management system.

DFID policy teams and country offices are the primary *audience* for the resulting learning. In addition, it is recognised that other stakeholders – including other development agencies supporting E&A, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and agencies implementing E&A initiatives, researchers and think tanks – would benefit from accessing the learning. The macro evaluation's *communications strategy*<sup>6</sup> sets out our intended approach to communicate findings to these audiences, with their diverse policy and practice interests. Digital outreach is an important part of this, and macro evaluation webpages,<sup>7</sup> located on the Itad website, are already being used as a central communications platform. As set out in the communications strategy, it is intended that the main findings presented in this report will be distilled into accessible communications products including a summary of what works, for whom and why, as well as a policy brief. The evaluation team will proactively disseminate these products and encourage discussion of the findings among target audiences through several 'events', including a seminar for DFID staff, a presentation to one of DFID Advisors' Continuing

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<sup>4</sup> DFID defines a macro evaluation as 'an evaluation intended to synthesise findings from a range of programme evaluations and other programme data in order to generate some generalisable findings (where possible)' (Macro Evaluation's ToR, p.1).

<sup>5</sup> DFID commissioned Itad to conduct a parallel macro evaluation focused on the strategic vision (SV) for girls and women under the same ToRs. Component C described in the ToRs relates to the latter. In June 2015, DFID took the decision to curtail the SV macro evaluation. This change and ensuring change in scope to the macro evaluation is documented in an addendum to the ToRs (Annex E).

<sup>6</sup> Version of April 2015, available on request.

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.itad.com/knowledge-and-resources/dfids-macro-evaluations/>

Professional Development conferences, a moderated e-discussion or webinar, and a social media campaign utilising known E&A information platforms such as the Global Partnership for Social Accountability and Eldis.

### 1.1.2 Social accountability within DFID's empowerment and accountability policy frame

Social accountability comprises the range of mechanisms that informed citizens (and their organisations) use to engage in a constructive process of holding a government to account for its actions and helping it become more effective.<sup>8</sup> Proponents believe that when citizens participate in social accountability (SAcc) processes – whether through participatory planning or through oversight and advocacy – their views and perspectives are more likely to be heard and to influence government policies and service delivery, leading to better quality services.<sup>9</sup> Critical observers of support to SAcc have, however, flagged the dangers of an absence of strategic, higher-level support. Jonathan Fox, notably, describes an ‘accountability trap’ in which SAcc’s contribution to improved services remains localised and short-lived in the absence of strategic intervention.<sup>10</sup>

Based on a literature review conducted during the inception phase of this macro evaluation,<sup>11</sup> a number of consensus issues emerge from the academic and practitioner literature relevant to SAcc interventions.<sup>12</sup> These are discussed in more detail in Annex A. In summary:

- Service delivery failures stemming from weak public sector accountability are, at root, a political economy challenge as much as a technical one
- Activating ‘political voice’ is more likely to emerge when citizens organise collectively around issues that immediately affect their lives; and often the barrier to citizen action is the capacity for collective action itself<sup>13</sup>
- Support for accountability processes can have an empowering effect on women’s political voice and capacity for collective action, but this effect is mediated by gendered social norms and the gendered division of labour
- Transparency and access to information is necessary but insufficient to stimulate action (voice), and thereby accountability, although it often has an inherent value

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<sup>8</sup> Malena, C. et al. (2004), ‘Social accountability: An introduction to the concept and emerging practice’, *Social Development Papers* No. 76. Washington, DC: World Bank, December.

<sup>9</sup> World Bank (2003), *World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People*. Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press.

<sup>10</sup> Fox, J. (2014), ‘Social Accountability: What does the evidence really say?’ GPSA Global Forum PowerPoint Presentation, 14 May. Available at <http://issuu.com/thegpsa/docs/social-accountability-04-13>

<sup>11</sup> Shutt, C. (2014), *Empowerment and Accountability Review of Evidence for the Itad Macro Evaluation*, 14 July. Brighton: Itad.

<sup>12</sup> A number of recent macro studies have looked at the relationship between SAcc and development outcomes. They include: Mansuri, G. and Rao, V. (2012), *Localizing Development: Does Participation Work? A World Bank Policy Research Report*. Washington DC, World Bank; Speer, J. (2012), ‘Participatory governance reform: a good strategy for increasing government responsiveness and improving public services?’ *World Development* 40(12): 2379, December 2012; and Gaventa, J. and Barrett, C. (2012), ‘Mapping the outcomes of citizen engagement’, *World Development* 40(12): 2399–410.

<sup>13</sup> See Joshi, A. (2013: 8), *Empowerment and Accountability Research: A Framing and Rapid Scoping Paper*, unpublished paper. University of Sussex: IDS, May.

- Working on both voice and accountability more consistently and systematically, is more effective than assuming that one leads to the other
- Donors need to be more realistic about what can be achieved in the shorter term, and extend funding horizons as much as possible.

DFID published its current policy frame for E&A in 2011.<sup>14</sup> Its publication coincided with a commitment to do more to enable poor people to exercise greater choice and control over their own development and to hold decision makers to account. At the same time, DFID's Development Policy Committee requested that DFID undertake a 'macro evaluation' of its investments in E&A to deepen accountability and widen learning and evidence building in this area (further background to the assignment is provided in the macro evaluation's Terms of Reference in Annex D).

DFID's conceptualisation of E&A has continued to evolve since then. This combines around the three overlapping lenses of social accountability, political accountability and economic empowerment. Social accountability in DFID's conceptualisation is underpinned broadly by a theory of change in which voice, choice and accountability in service delivery will improve the quality, accessibility and reliability of services, and secure longer-term improvements in well-being. This conceptualisation is discussed in more detail in Annex A.

## 1.2 Methodology<sup>15</sup>

The methodology for the macro evaluations applied a mixed-method design to generate evidence of what works, for whom, in what contexts and why. In 2015, the macro evaluation team completed a portfolio synopsis.<sup>16</sup> This presented background descriptive statistics on the total 'population' of DFID E&A projects based on a screening and tabulated mapping process. We then focused on synthesising and analysing a 'project set' of 50 projects relevant specifically to social accountability. The social accountability project set analysis, presented in this report, synthesised a wide range of largely secondary evidence to identify and interpret underlying causal mechanisms.

The approach sequenced a deductive pattern-finding qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) method (based on hypothesis testing) with an in-depth narrative analysis method (see Figure 1.1). The QCA identified significant configurations of factors<sup>17</sup> that were associated with a given project outcome. The narrative analysis then examined these causal configurations in greater depth, exploring how they worked in different contexts and under what conditions.

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
<sup>14</sup> Empowering Poor People and Strengthening Accountability, undated, DFID.

<sup>15</sup> A full methodology for the macro evaluation is presented in Annex B.

<sup>16</sup> Portfolio Synopsis in Empowerment and Accountability Annual Technical Report 2015, May 2015, ePact.

<sup>17</sup> Called 'conditions' in QCA language.

**Figure 1.1: Macro evaluation methodology**




Source: Authors

**1.2.1 The project set analysis methodology: A summary**

We applied a ten-step methodology to conduct the project set analysis. This is presented in Figure 1.2 and summarised below.

**Figure 1.2: Project set analysis methodology**



Source: Authors

Using the 2,379 projects from the E&A project portfolio, we went through the following ten steps:

1. **Construct a database of projects meeting inclusion/exclusion criteria:** During the inception phase, we had identified 180 of DFID projects relevant to social accountability, and uploaded associated documentation onto the macro evaluation database. To reach this number, all DFID projects approved since 2011 and active at that time in DFID priority countries were screened according to a number of inclusion and exclusion criteria. The methodology for this process can be found in the Annual Technical Report 2015.<sup>18</sup>
2. **Screen for quality of outcome contribution analysis:** An initial screen of all 180 SAcc projects applied three quality criteria (transparency, triangulation and contribution). This produced a SAcc project set of 84 projects that met minimum data quality requirements. A deeper review of project documentation then focused on the strength of outcome contribution analysis, vital for utility in our mixed-method approach. We needed to ensure that there was adequate documentary evidence to understand the causality of changes achieved for those hypotheses being tested. This produced a set of 50 SAcc projects.
3. **Conduct representativeness analysis:** Given that our sample included *all* projects with sufficient data quality and was not subject to purposive sampling which might introduce bias, we believe that the project selection is as close to a probability-based sample as it was possible. A probability-based sample would have required detailed coding of the whole DFID E&A portfolio, which was far beyond the scope of this macro evaluation. To further minimise concerns over generalisability, however, we applied a representativeness test. This confirmed that this project set was a good reflection of the 180-project SAcc portfolio against a number of key criteria.
4. **Conduct literature review and DFID consultations:** We identified the key theories of change underpinning DFID SAcc interventions, which we did through a review of relevant applied research literature. This guided follow-up reflective discussions with the DFID steering group and individual key informants. These reflections complemented our understanding of DFID change processes gleaned through the screening process (steps 1-2 above).
5. **Identify and code project 'conditions':** Our understanding of project theories of change enabled us to categorise project processes as mixes of a number of commonly occurring 'conditions'. We expressed these as context, mechanism and outcome conditions, defined as follows (Table B1 in Annex B includes a list of all conditions with detailed definitions and rubrics):
  - **Outcome** conditions refer to longer-term development results in service delivery to which the project aspires and contributes, but which are not entirely within the control of the project

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<sup>18</sup> Annex B: Methodology for the Macro Evaluation in Empowerment and Accountability Annual Technical Report 2015, May 2015, ePact.



- **Intermediate outcome** conditions represent changes in social accountability-related processes, relations or behaviours en route to improved service delivery
  - **Context** conditions refer to aspects of the environment that affect the achievement of project outcomes, often in complex and unpredictable ways. We identified a set of contextual conditions that are particularly significant to social accountability. These were adapted from O’Meally’s (2013) categorisation of context domains<sup>19</sup>
  - **Mechanism** conditions comprise interacting project elements that collectively contribute to the project outcome according to the project’s theory of change. There are a number of intervention mechanisms that are employed by projects in different mixes. These mechanisms encompass local-level demand and supply-side support to promote social accountability but in some projects extend to supporting change in higher-level policy processes.
6. **Extract data to score conditions:** We tabulated these conditions and extracted data from project documents to justify a binary score of ‘1’ (condition largely present) or ‘0’ (condition largely absent). When there was insufficient evidence to judge a condition, it was rated as missing and a blank cell was left in the QCA dataset. We used detailed definitions and rubrics to ensure a standardised and replicable application of this scoring method. We used cross-checking techniques to ensure reliability of the coding. Extracted data against each condition can be found on the macro evaluation database, ensuring a transparent evidence trail from the data to our coding.
7. **Develop testable hypotheses:** We developed a set of 17 testable hypotheses (listed in Annex B) through our discussions with DFID stakeholders (step 4 above). We expressed these hypotheses as configurations of contexts, mechanisms and outcomes. In this way, each hypothesis was expressed as a combination of different contextual factors, project mechanisms and anticipated outcomes. We sought DFID approval of these hypotheses prior to starting the analysis.
8. **Conduct QCA of hypothesis configurations:** We conducted QCA of these 17 hypothesised configurations (with detailed findings presented in Annex C) to measure the strength of association between any given cluster of conditions and any given outcome. We tested both the configurations of conditions specified in the hypotheses and single conditions within each hypothesis. Given the large number of gaps in the database (see details under ‘Methodology limitations’ below), more inductive analysis using Boolean minimisation was not possible. Annex B includes more detail on our approach to hypothesis testing.
9. **Select hypotheses and sample project cases for narrative analysis:** We selected 7 out of the 17 hypotheses for narrative analysis that would interpret and illustrate the associations revealed by the QCA. These seven hypotheses were selected purposefully, and in collaboration with DFID colleagues, as having yielded particularly strong associations for a large number of cases under QCA analysis (step 8). We selected 13 project cases for this in-depth narrative analysis. For each hypothesis, we focused on the dominant configuration and we identified two clusters of cases to be subjected to narrative analysis: (i) cases that exemplified the configuration of

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<sup>19</sup> O’Meally describes five overlapping contextual domains that sit within a sixth, global domain. See O’Meally, S.C. (2013), *Mapping Context for Social Accountability*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

conditions associated with a given outcome of interest (consistent cases); and (ii) cases that were inconsistent, having the same configuration of conditions but with outcome absent (inconsistent cases). Within each cluster, we used 'Hamming distance of similarity' measure to sample the most typical ('modal') and atypical ('outlier') cases in a transparent manner.

- 10. Integrate reporting of QCA with narrative analysis:** The narrative analysis sought to illustrate the QCA findings through the construction of simple readable narratives. These connected the conditions in the dominant configuration of each context-mechanism-outcome (CMO) hypothesis in a way that was both plausible and respectful of the facts. The narrative analysis also aimed to excavate further to establish whether there was a 'real-life' causal mechanism or explanatory model that connected the events described by the configuration of conditions found via QCA. We systematically interrogated inconsistencies by selecting inconsistent cases for narrative analysis and investigating in detail why these inconsistent cases had failed to display the outcome. Contrasting consistent cases and inconsistent cases to achieve a deeper level of understanding was a key element of the narrative analysis.. We supplemented our narrative analysis documentary evidence with key informant interviews. These were conducted with individuals who were deeply involved in the project and/or who had been linked to the project in an evaluative capacity. The narrative analysis case studies are collected together in an accompanying Volume 2 to this report.

### **1.2.2 Methodology limitations**

Throughout the application of this methodology we applied robustness principles to increase the (i) reliability, (ii) internal validity, and (iii) external validity of the findings. These three robustness principles, along with a fourth cross-cutting principle of transparency, are discussed in more detail in a Robustness Note, included as Annex E.

Despite this purposeful application of robustness principles, the methodology remained subject to a number of limitations, including:

- The use of nationally comparable indices for context conditions – such as the CIVICUS Enabling Environment Index (all indexes listed in Annex B, Table B1) – allowed us to standardise and increase the reliability of the QCA scoring for context. These context conditions were agreed with DFID staff as part of the hypothesis development process in 2015 after a careful reading of some relevant case study documentation. However, this decision to use existing indices created data gaps in cases where specific countries were not covered by any given index.
- The subsequent application of a binary score to these project context conditions generally proved to be too crude to be of utility. We were measuring the complexity of national context and its variation over project areas and over project lifetime. This rendered the binary scoring approach to be too insensitive to be useful as a pattern-finding tool for the influence of context. However, creating a more 'granular' set of contextual categories would have reduced our ability to score a sufficient number of projects against each context criterion for this to be useful for QCA analysis of clusters of conditions. This is because QCA requires a minimum number of scored conditions

for significance to be established. However, it may be useful in future macro evaluations to explore this option through re-analysing existing case studies to determine whether it would be possible to identify mid-level context conditions that are more specific but still broad enough to be usefully coded across all cases.

- The QCA dataset had data gaps, with 104 out of 1,200 data points missing. The majority (67) of these 104 missing data points related to project contexts and gaps in index coverage (discussed in the first bullet point above). Out of the remaining 37 missing data points, the majority (29) related to project intermediate outcome or outcome conditions for which we had insufficient evidence to score a '1' or a '0'. This meant that there were data gaps for each hypothesis tested, requiring the manual construction of 17 different sub-data sets. Most significantly, the data gaps limited our ability to perform more inductive analysis using QCA software and Boolean minimisation procedures. Hypothesis testing as agreed with DFID hence remained our primary approach.
- Our ability to iterate was limited due to time and resource constraints linked to the sequencing of the methods. Combining QCA with narrative analysis required sequencing each evaluation step carefully, which resulted in a long timeline. For instance, hypotheses had to be finalised before data extraction and coding could begin. Similarly, QCA had to be finalised before the case studies for our narrative analysis were selected using the 'Hamming distance of similarity'. At the same time, both data extraction/coding and narrative analysis threw up additional factors and hypotheses to be tested which would have benefited from another round of data extraction/coding. The resulting modifications to the dataset might also have affected the case study selection (through changes to the 'Hamming distance of similarity'), possibly generating another set of additional factors and hypotheses, and so on. Finally, it might also have been interesting to check the refined theory against the overall portfolio of 180 SAcc project. In short, iteration could have been useful but would have required a large amount of additional time and resources that were not available. This was not budgeted for nor agreed with DFID.
- We did not complete the sensitivity analysis of the QCA data set as detailed in the Robustness Note. Instead, we relied on the 'natural experiment' of a second-round, modified QCA data set, which provided us with a proxy sensitivity test (see Annex B for more detail). This was a fit-for-purpose alternative and affected the dataset as a whole, with most hypotheses being tested on different sub-datasets. However, there was one exception: the dataset relevant to hypothesis 6 was left unaffected and the 'natural experiment' did not work for this hypothesis specifically. As a consequence we cannot claim to have performed a sensitivity test for this hypothesis in particular.
- While limited generalisation<sup>20</sup> is possible for our QCA findings, findings from the narrative analysis are only illustrative. The cases are used to illustrate what the hypotheses look like in practice and provide a more in-depth understanding of how change comes about. However, this means that insights from the narrative analysis are not necessarily applicable to other cases and that they could not provide the foundation for our recommendations.

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<sup>20</sup> In the sense discussed in Befani, B. (2016). Pathways to change: Evaluating development interventions with qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). Stockholm, p. 145 onwards.

- Through the initial review of project reporting in the SAcc project portfolio, we were able to confirm a minimum level of evaluative data quality in the selection of the 50 projects included in the final set. Nonetheless, the evaluative quality of data for these projects still varied considerably in terms of coverage and analytical depth. Areas where evidence for narrative analysis was most inconsistent included evaluative reporting on: (i) the contribution of (changing) context conditions to achieving outcomes; and (ii) the achievement of outcomes for different marginalised groups, particularly when there was no clear target group. This affected the depth of narrative analysis that could be achieved for any given project. The approach taken attempted to extract evidence on how causality was operating from existing reviews and evaluation, which in most cases had not used a theory/causality driven approach. Consequently, in most cases, evidence was insufficient to explain causal mechanisms in great depth. The presence of actual evaluations (as opposed to evaluative content in project reporting) was rare.
- Following on from the above, collecting primary data through key informant interviews proved effective in deepening our understanding of project contribution to change but was time-limited. We were able to engage with 20 key informants relating to 13 projects but the tight timeline prevented us from reaching out more broadly.


### **1.3 Structure of this annual technical report**

This report presents the findings from an analysis of 50 SAcc projects. Following this introductory section, Sections 2–4 report on the key findings from our analysis of three clusters of SAcc hypotheses. The CMO configurations, which form the basis of the hypotheses, are presented in Figure 1.3 below. These hypotheses cover three focus areas prioritised by DFID through collaborative discussion. Section 5 synthesises key conclusions learned from these findings relating to DFID’s experience with SAcc interventions. Section 6 highlights operational recommendations as part of an ongoing ‘way forward’ discussion.

The main report is supported by a set of annexes. A fuller discussion of the framing of the SAcc macro evaluation – the global evidence base and DFID’s E&A framework – is presented in Annex A. A full methodology for the macro evaluation is presented in Annex B. The full QCA findings are included in Annex C. The macro evaluation ToRs are included in Annex D. A methodology Robustness Note is included in Annex E.

This report comprises Volume 1 of a two-volume submission. Volume 2 contains 13 detailed project case studies selected for narrative analysis as described in the methodology section above and to which we refer particularly in Sections 2–4 of the report below.

**Figure 1.3:** CMO composition of social accountability hypotheses<sup>21</sup>



<sup>21</sup> Bold arrows illustrate confirmed hypotheses, while dotted arrows show rejected or ambivalent hypotheses.

## 2 Findings under Focus Area 1: The ‘accountability trap’

In this and the following two Sections (3 and 4), we discuss our findings under each of the three focus areas introduced in Section 1 above. Under this first focus area we examine combinations of social accountability (SAcc) mechanisms that are hypothesised to be associated with improved service delivery. We distinguish between service delivery outcomes in the direct area of project influence and higher-level, ‘at-scale’ service delivery. The hypotheses collectively examine aspects of the ‘accountability trap’ as identified by Fox<sup>22</sup> and discussed in Section 1 above.

**Hypothesis 1** looks at combining macro-level policy support with upward flows of evidence and learning. It posits that this will strengthen the ‘enabling environment’ for SAcc relations to improve service delivery at scale. This brings the spotlight on DFID SAcc interventions that attempt to bridge the gap between micro-level intervention and macro-level policy change. Micro-level intervention involves supporting discussions between service users and service providers at facility level about the quality of service delivery. Macro-level intervention involves supporting the enabling environment of policies and governance arrangements that enable citizens to claim their rights to services. An ‘upward flow of information’ involves introducing evidence on service delivery outcomes and impacts into these higher-level discussions.

**Hypotheses 2a and 2b** focus on support to formal and informal citizen engagement. They posit that a mix of both types of engagement will improve service delivery within local project areas (hypothesis 2a) and at scale (hypothesis 2b). These hypotheses concentrate on DFID SAcc projects that focus support to ‘demand-side’ citizen action. This support is channelled typically through support to existing or new discussion platforms. These platforms bring service providers or local officials together with service users. ‘Formal’ citizen engagement occurs with service providers in ‘invited’ forums that are officially established. Support can also be provided to more ‘informal’ forms of individual action or collective mobilisation. Informal citizen engagement is ‘uninvited’ and takes place outside of officially established forums.

Box 2.1 summarises the concepts of necessity and sufficiency which are frequently applied in this section.<sup>23</sup>

### Box 2.1: The concepts of necessity and sufficiency

#### **Necessity:**

A condition (or combination of conditions) is necessary for an outcome if it is always present when the outcome occurs. In practice, this means that all successful cases had the condition in place; but that there were cases where the condition was in place that did not become successful (necessary but not sufficient).

For this macro evaluation, a condition was considered necessary if a necessity consistency threshold of 90% was reached.<sup>24</sup> Necessity coverage measures are given to indicate the exclusivity with which a condition is necessary.

#### **Sufficiency:**

<sup>22</sup> Fox (2014), op. cit.

<sup>23</sup> For more details, see Befani (2016).

<sup>24</sup> See Annex B for more details.

A condition (or combination of conditions) is sufficient for an outcome if the outcome always occurs when the condition (or combination of conditions) is present. In practice, this means that every time the condition was in place, success was observed, but some cases were successful even without the condition (sufficient but not necessary).

For this macro evaluation, a condition was considered sufficient if a sufficiency consistency threshold of 90% was reached. Sufficiency coverage measures are given to indicate the relative importance of the condition with respect to others.

**Example:** Hypothesis 3 posits that the combination of awareness raising (condition M4) and supporting socially inclusive platforms (condition M6) is sufficient for achieving improved services for marginalised groups (Outcome O3). Our QCA analysis confirmed that this combination was indeed sufficient to bring about the desired outcome. However, the combination proved not to be necessary. Support to socially inclusive local platforms alone was sufficient to achieve this outcome, which meant that the outcome always occurred when this condition was present. On the other hand, awareness raising by itself proved to be necessary but not sufficient to achieve the outcome. This meant that it was always present when the outcome was achieved but was also present when the outcome was not achieved.

## 2.1 Hypothesis 1: Linking macro-level policy support with upward feeding evidence to improve at-scale service delivery

### 2.1.1 Summary findings of hypothesis 1

Focus Area 1: The 'accountability trap' – Hypothesis 1	
<b>Hypothesis</b>	<p><b>Hypothesis 1:</b> Improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2) is achieved only when SAcc mechanisms include support for feeding evidence and learning into higher-level discussions (M7) and higher-level legislative and policy change (M1).</p> <div style="text-align: center; margin-top: 10px;"> <pre> graph LR     A[Feeding evidence and learning into higher-level discussions] -- "+" --&gt; B[Support for higher-level legislative and policy change]     B -- "→" --&gt; C[Improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery]                     </pre> </div>
<b>QCA finding</b>	<p>Hypothesis 1 was rejected. The wording of the hypothesis suggests a necessity relationship which was tested using QCA.</p> <p><b>None of the conditions in the model nor their combination was found to be necessary for achieving improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2).</b> Both support for feeding evidence and learning into higher-level discussions (M7) and higher-level legislative and policy change (M1) as single conditions are slightly more necessary, but remain rather weak explanations for the outcome. The hypothesised combination is neither necessary nor sufficient, having a necessity consistency of 58% (7 out of 12 cases), and a necessity coverage of 29% (7 out of 24 cases).</p>

<b>Narrative analysis finding</b>	<p>The narrative analysis points to some additional explanations for achieving improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery. However, the inconsistent case sampled for narrative analysis was found not to have had sufficient time to achieve the outcome, limiting a deeper assessment of causality.</p>				
	<p>While the hypothesis is rejected, the narrative analysis provides illustrative evidence that <b>improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2) <u>can</u> be achieved when SAcc processes are embedded in policy or programme frameworks and evidence is channelled upwards into these processes as part of support to higher-level legislative and policy change.</b><sup>25</sup> However, the evidence is not strong enough to develop a refined theory.</p>				
<pre> graph LR     A[Embedding SAcc in policy or programme frameworks] -- "+" --&gt; B[Channelling evidence upwards into policy or programme processes]     B -- "+" --&gt; C[Support for higher-level legislative and policy change]     C -- "→" --&gt; D[Improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery]             </pre> <table style="width: 100%; margin-top: 10px; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 25%; padding: 5px;">                 RGCF/COPE ✓                  RWSP ✓                  KADP ✓             </td> <td style="width: 25%; padding: 5px;">                 RGCF/COPE ✓                  RWSP ✓                  KADP ✓             </td> <td style="width: 25%; padding: 5px;">                 RGCF/COPE ✓                  RWSP ✓                  KADP ✓             </td> <td style="width: 25%; padding: 5px;">                 RGCF/COPE ✓                  RWSP ✓                  KADP ✗             </td> </tr> </table>		RGCF/COPE ✓ RWSP ✓ KADP ✓	RGCF/COPE ✓ RWSP ✓ KADP ✓	RGCF/COPE ✓ RWSP ✓ KADP ✓	RGCF/COPE ✓ RWSP ✓ KADP ✗
RGCF/COPE ✓ RWSP ✓ KADP ✓	RGCF/COPE ✓ RWSP ✓ KADP ✓	RGCF/COPE ✓ RWSP ✓ KADP ✓	RGCF/COPE ✓ RWSP ✓ KADP ✗		

### 2.1.2 Testing the hypothesis

This section explains in detail how the hypothesis was tested through the application of QCA. Given that the hypothesis suggests a necessity relationship, its validity is tested through parameters of fit in relation to necessity. We establish whether the evidence confirms or rejects the hypothesis, based on the criteria identified in the methodology section of this report.

**Hypothesis 1: Improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2) is achieved only when SAcc mechanisms include support for feeding evidence and learning into higher-level discussions (M7) and higher-level legislative and policy change (M1)**

#### Hypothesis rejected

In QCA terms, the hypothesis posits that the combination of support for feeding evidence and learning into higher-level discussions (M7) and higher-level legislative and policy change (M1) is necessary for achieving improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery. This is rejected. The combination is neither necessary nor sufficient and has a necessity consistency of 58% (7 out of 12 cases) and a necessity coverage of 29% (7 out of 24 cases).

Supporting higher-level legislative and policy change (M1) as a single condition is also neither necessary nor sufficient, but has a higher necessity consistency of 83% (10 out of 12 cases) and necessity coverage of 32% (10 out of 31 cases). Feeding evidence and learning into higher-level discussions (M7) as a single condition is also neither necessary nor sufficient. Necessity consistency for this condition is 75% (9 out of 12 cases) and necessity coverage

<sup>25</sup> Light teal indicates that a condition was identified through the narrative analysis and is illustrative only. Boxes with dark purple and dark teal stripes indicate that a condition was identified through both QCA and the narrative analysis.



27% (9 out of 33). This is a slightly higher consistency than for the combination of conditions but still lower than for M1 by itself. In the cluster of five cases where both of these mechanisms were absent there is no case of improved higher-level service delivery.

Table 2.1 shows the distribution of cases for each tested configuration.

**Table 2.1: QCA analysis of competing models for hypothesis 1**

<b>Mechanisms</b>	<b>Outcome: Higher-level service delivery improved (O2)</b>		
Number of cases in this model: 45	<b>Present</b>	<b>Absent</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>M1 and M7 both present</b>	7	17	24
<b>M1 present (M7 absent)</b>	3	4	7
<b>M7 present (M1 absent)</b>	2	7	9
<b>M1 and M7 both absent</b>	0	5	5
<b>Mechanisms</b>	<b>Outcome: Higher-level service delivery improved (O2)</b>		
Number of cases in this model: 45	<b>Present</b>	<b>Absent</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>M1 present (as a single condition)</b>	10	21	31
<b>M1 absent (as a single condition)</b>	2	12	14
<b>Mechanisms</b>	<b>Outcome: Higher-level service delivery improved (O2)</b>		
Number of cases in this model: 45	<b>Present</b>	<b>Absent</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>M7 present (as a single condition)</b>	9	24	33
<b>M7 absent (as a single condition)</b>	3	9	12

None of the conditions in the model nor their combination was found to be necessary for achieving improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2). Both support for feeding evidence and learning into higher-level discussions (M7) and higher-level legislative and policy change (M1) as single conditions are slightly more necessary, but remain very weak explanations for the outcome.

### 2.1.3 Illustrating the hypothesised causal relationships

The focus of the narrative analysis is in the first instance to illustrate comparatively sampled consistent and inconsistent cases of the hypothesised causal relationship. The following two consistent case studies were selected:<sup>26</sup>

- Consistent case (modal): Rights and Governance Challenge Fund/Creating Opportunities for the Poor and Excluded (Bangladesh) (RGCF/COPE) Bangladesh, 2004–16 (#113976)
- Consistent case (outlier): Rural Water Supply Programme in Tanzania (RWSP), 2012–15 (#202852)

The starting point for the narrative analysis is the overall QCA finding that neither support for feeding evidence and learning into higher-level discussions (M7) nor higher-level legislative and policy change (M1) seem to be necessary for achieving improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2). Nonetheless, cases emerged where this combination of conditions contributed to successful higher-level change. Table 2.2 summarises the two consistent case studies and documents reported evidence of improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery:

**Table 2.2: Consistent case summaries for hypothesis 1**

Consistent case (modal): RGCF/COPE Bangladesh, 2004–16 (#113976)	Consistent case (outlier): Rural Water Supply Programme in Tanzania (RWSP), 2012–15 (#202852)
<p>The RGCF/COPE programme promoted citizen engagement through collective rights awareness raising and support to mobilisation. The programme was designed to increase access among the poorest and most marginalised citizens to a range of services.</p> <p><b>RGCF/COPE achieved improved higher-level service delivery (O2).</b> A recent evaluation found that the programme contributed to significant results:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An additional 129,000 poor and vulnerable households benefiting from social safety nets worth £6 million</li> <li>• 46,500 additional children completing primary school</li> <li>• 51,000 women and girls victims of violence obtaining medical and/or legal assistance</li> <li>• 500 men and women from marginalised groups to elected to local government bodies</li> <li>• 105,000 workers organised to claim an annual pay increase and 51,000 more workers with decent working conditions</li> </ul>	<p>The RWSP was designed to improve and sustain government policy implementation of its Water Sector Development Programme (WSDP).</p> <p><b>RWSP achieved improved higher-level service delivery (O2).</b> Results achieved include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An additional 6.6 million people were provided with access to improved water sources</li> <li>• This particularly helped women and girls who spend most of their time fetching water from distant water sources</li> <li>• DFID attributed the number of beneficiaries provided with access to improved sources of water as a result of DFID support through the RWSP as 960,000</li> </ul>

<sup>26</sup> See methodology section for details on the selection procedure.

Consistent case (modal): RGCF/COPE Bangladesh, 2004–16 (#113976)	Consistent case (outlier): Rural Water Supply Programme in Tanzania (RWSP), 2012–15 (#202852)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>22,000 more acres of <i>khas</i> (publicly owned) land leased to poor and vulnerable landless people</li> </ul>	

**Supporting higher-level legislative and policy change (M1) was found to contribute to improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2)**

Overall, the two consistent cases provide illustrative evidence in support of the hypothesis. They confirm that there is a link between support to higher-level legislative and policy change (M1) and improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2).

The **RGCF/COPE** programme targeted a number of higher-level legislative and policy change processes in Bangladesh. This higher-level policy advocacy expanded entitlement sets for poor and marginalised citizens to a range of services and resources. Without this higher-level engagement, the local-level SAcc processes supported by programme grantees would not have been able to leverage these expanded entitlements. Programme evaluations<sup>27</sup> confirmed that in its role as policy level advocate, the programme management organisation (PMO) made notable ‘wins’ in influencing targeted legislative and policy reform in support of ‘at-scale’ service delivery and linked these higher-level success to increased access to services to marginalised citizens across a range of sectors. These expanded entitlements included notably:

- Under its Violence Against Women programme, the PMO tackled legal protections and rights linked to violence against women. The PMO and partners advocated strategically over a 12-year period on key areas of policy and legislation, including notably two key pieces of legislation. The first, the Domestic Violence Prevention and Protection Act and its Rules, provided a legal basis for prosecuting domestic violence and accessing victim services. PMO grantees then worked at grassroots level to enhance SAcc processes, ensuring the implementation of the law with particular focus on monitoring institutions such as police, hospitals and courts. Grantees also developed women leaders in their communities and provided them with training on women’s rights, leadership and mediation. The women volunteers mediated in family conflicts and took part in a number of community and local government committees. The women leaders also helped mobilise women to protest the lack of respect for women’s rights. Second, through advocating successfully with partners for a Hindu Marriage Registration Act, the PMO was able to secure equal rights for religious-minority married Hindu women and thus their access to divorce courts and victim services. PMO grantees then mobilised Hindu communities at local level to register their marriages.
- PMO advocacy on land law involved drafting a single, harmonised land law that strengthened landless citizens’ rights to government-owned *khas* land. This extended

<sup>27</sup> The PCR for RGCF Phase II (2008–13) and subsequent evaluative reporting on the successor COPE programme.

*khas* land titles, and land titling services, to thousands of previously landless households. Programme grantees then worked on SAcc processes, supporting landless groups to engage with land titling service providers while at the same time assisting those authorities with local listings of eligible landless households.

- The PMO's Dalit programme engaged policymakers through a network of partners to increase awareness and action around Dalit rights. This advocacy was initiated in a context where there was no policy or legal framework (except the Constitution) covering discrimination, hardly any understanding of Dalit rights issues and little attention given to their ostracism. The PMO engaged in the drafting of an Anti-Discrimination Act that included every marginalised group. At the same time its advocacy on Dalits resulted in the very first budget allocations for social welfare provisions for Dalits and housing for Harijion (cleaners' caste). To encourage social change, the PMO also funded national and local advocacy campaigns, involving the media, to protest acts of discrimination and rights violations against Dalits. Grantees also worked on local-level SAcc processes: on the supply side assisting district and Upazila offices to identify and list Dalit beneficiaries for social welfare transfers; and on the demand side to assist Dalit communities to raise rights awareness and to mobilise to claim their rights to these transfers as well as to equitable access to health and education services.

The Tanzania **RWSP** was a more narrowly focused programme than the RGCF/COPE but nonetheless worked on the same principle of working at higher levels of decision making. The programme targeted the Government of Tanzania's policy goal of extending universal access to water and sanitation services. The programme built on the policy progress made by the government's WSDP that was initiated in 2006/7. Through the RWSP, DFID provided a total of £30 million over 3 years (from 2012 to 2015) to give 652,000 people in Tanzania access to clean water and improved sanitation. Programme reporting confirmed the instrumental role of the programme in influencing the policy-enabling environment for SAcc processes. The Project Completion Report observed:

*The whole programme is anchored around delivering WASH services at scale and through government systems. Hence, the overall outcome of the programme is assessed within the broader WSDP I.<sup>28</sup>*

**Feeding evidence and learning into higher-level discussions (M7) was found to contribute to improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2) if channelled directly into policies and programmes**

In both consistent cases, evidence generated locally was fed directly into policy and programme processes, and contributed to deliver services at scale.

Under the Tanzania **RWSP**, outcome evidence was generated by local equity and budget monitoring. This monitoring was conducted by a national citizen monitoring network – TAWASANET – established under the programme. Evidence was reported upwards into higher-level water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) sector and budget review processes. However, after initial success in contributing to strengthened SAcc processes at scale, the

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<sup>28</sup> DFID (2015), op. cit., p.3.

network became limited in its effectiveness as a national civil society voice. This was largely due to under-resourcing. The RWSP Project Completion Report concluded that while WSDP services were rolled out successfully, the *quality* of their delivery would have been improved with a stronger citizen voice both locally and nationally. This was reflected in the limited quality and credibility of the civil society organisation (CSO) network TAWASANET's equity and budget monitoring:

- Equity monitoring was produced annually and adequately informed the WASH sector, with an equity status report produced by TAWASANET and presented at the Annual Joint Water Sector review. The Project Completion Review (PCR) reported that this was 'partially achieved': *'Equity reports were produced annually but there were concerns on quality and adequacy to inform the WASH sector.'*<sup>29</sup>
- The programme also funded local CSOs to undertake budget and expenditure monitoring in selected local government authorities to feed evidence into improving intra-district and inter-district budget allocation for water and sanitation services. The PCR<sup>30</sup> reported, however, that *budget and expenditure monitoring (was) limited in ten districts due to limited capacity of local CSOs.* The PCR directly identified this capacity gap and the constraint it placed on meaningful CSO engagement in policy dialogue:

*The Ministry of Water recognises the role played by CSOs and is credited for its constructive relationship with them. However, CSO capacity to engage in constructive dialogue with government at local and national level remains a huge challenge and requires much support to strengthen their voice. TAWASANET lacks clear purpose of being and does not appear to receive sufficient guidance from the member CSOs and or the advisory committee members.*<sup>31</sup>

Under the **RGCF/COPE** programme, policy advocacy was backed by the introduction of outcome and impact evidence. The programme purposefully carved out space for participation in policy decision making. Evidence was gathered by programme grantee partners working at the local level. These local partners had high capacity and received institutional support from the PMO that bridged the gap between local impacts and national policy discussions. The grantees then supported citizens to claim their entitlements and hold service providers and local officials to account (see hypothesis 2a below). At the same time, the PMO ensured that this evidence was fed into policy reform discussions and drafting. It did so in the drafting of a wide range of enabling laws and policies, including the Dalit safety net, Hindu Marriage Registration Act, Domestic Violence Protection and Prevention Act and Land Law. In its support to the drafting and adoption of a National Child Labour Eradication Policy, for instance, the PMO drew on evidence from grassroots consultation. This ensured that the Policy was well designed and nationally owned. Similarly, as part of its advocacy for combating violence against women, the PMO collected data on surveys and case studies through its partners. This was used to help policymakers design better legislation based on their increased understanding of the discrimination and violence against women due to existing marriage practices in the Hindu communities and the absence of a Hindu Marriage Law.

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<sup>29</sup> DFID (2015), *Tanzania Rural Water Supply Programme: Project Completion Review*. London: DFID, p.16.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p.16.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p.24.

Significantly, when considered necessary, the PMO was also able to work more independently of the government to exert pressure on policymakers through external advocacy. Under the Child Labour programme, for instance, lobbying for improvements in the legislative framework was proving virtually impossible in the face of a number of non-responsive ministries. So the PMO and grantee partners decided to pursue a different route by seeking support from United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) to increase pressure on the government to comply with the Convention on the Rights of the Child and urgently update the antiquated national legislative framework. Against this backdrop of pressure from Geneva to comply with the Convention, the PMO started a dialogue with the government focused on their obligation to report back again in 5 years. This proved crucial in persuading the government that a stronger policy was needed to protect vulnerable working children.

#### 2.1.4 Looking for explanations

Given that QCA rejected the initial hypotheses without providing alternative explanations, the narrative analysis is particularly important to explore other explanations for the achievement of improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2). In addition, the interrogation of an inconsistent case, summarised in the table below, is sought to help achieve a deeper understanding of the causal mechanisms at play.. The following inconsistent case was selected:<sup>32</sup>

- Inconsistent case (modal): Kenya Accountable Devolution Programme, 2012–15 (#202988)

**Table 2.3: Inconsistent case summary for hypothesis 1**

Inconsistent case (modal): Kenya Accountable Devolution Programme, 2012–15 (#202988)
<p>The KADP provided technical assistance, through World Bank management, to support the transition to devolved (county) government in Kenya under the provisions of the 2010 Constitution.</p> <p><b>KADP did not achieve improved higher-level service delivery (O2).</b> No service delivery improvements at scale were reported. However, the programme enhanced the enabling environment for SAcc at county level, including through deepening mechanisms for transparency, participation and accountability. The programme also included a SAcc pilot in nine communities under the Kenya Health Sector Support Project, which achieved improved service delivery at the local level.</p>

#### **Embedding SAcc processes in policy or programme frameworks increased chances of improving higher-level (at-scale) service delivery**

In all three sampled cases, the SAcc processes were clearly embedded in policy or programme frameworks. This provided a clear policy direction for service delivery and provided leverage and clear entitlements for SAcc to work towards, thus improving service delivery at the point of delivery.

Under the ‘consistent case’ Tanzania **RWSP**, support for SAcc processes was aligned to clear government programmatic goals to deliver entitlements to the poor, with particular benefits to women and girls. It was the long-term initiative of the Government of Tanzania to achieve

<sup>32</sup> See methodology section for details on the selection procedure.

water supply and sanitation delivery at scale through its WSDP, in which the RWSP was institutionally anchored. The WSDP successfully delivered water points at scale to communities (see Table 2.2) while providing an opportunity for citizen engagement with service providers in their communities. The RWSP supported this SAcc process through the creation of the aforesaid TAWASANET.

Evaluative reporting indicates the programme ‘got it right’ on embedding its support in a national initiative for ‘at-scale’ water delivery:<sup>33</sup>

*Institutional coordination arrangements between MoW [Ministry of Works] and PMO-RALG<sup>34</sup> improved significantly: a joint Annual Work Plan sets out roles and responsibilities between the Directorate of Rural WASH at MoW and the Water Sector Working Group at PMO-RALG. These two Ministries have Quarterly Coordination Meetings at Director-level and bi-annual meetings at PS-level. These meetings are not only consultative but are also decision-making bodies on matters relating to inter-governmental operational arrangements.<sup>35</sup>*

That said, the Project Completion Report balanced the long-term potential gains of at-scale service delivery against the additional risks that this approach brings regarding sustaining quality of delivery:

*Delivering through government led WSDP basket funding arrangement is the most viable way to deliver WASH services at scale and engage meaningfully in sector policy dialogue. However, there are trade-offs around delayed funding flow, weak institutional capacity to deliver and high fiduciary risks-which need to be managed carefully to ensure programme deliver sustained results and Value for Money.<sup>36</sup>*

Similarly, the ‘consistent case’ Bangladesh **RGCF/COPE** programme anchored SAcc processes in policy processes that promoted concrete improvements in service delivery. The RGCF/COPE PMO was politically astute in engaging with these policy processes. It identified opportunities for progressive policy influence (e.g. on social welfare and land law) and targeted open-minded/likeminded policymakers and public officials. This policy advocacy created new entitlements and/or a stronger commitment by the government to deliver existing entitlements. Under these areas of policy level reform, the programme grantee partners facilitated local SAcc processes. The SAcc processes centred on, for instance, claims to social safety nets and government land titling services. The SAcc processes were made more transparent by the PMO’s ongoing advocacy for a Right to Information Act that would increase transparency and responsiveness among service providers.

Like the RWSP and RGCF/COPE programmes, **KADP** was embedded in a clear policy framework. It was integrated with devolution to county-level governance under Kenya’s new Constitution. The Constitution provided clear legal backing and incentives for transparent and accountable governance. This confirmed the promise of enhanced SAcc relationships through devolved government that was more transparent and accountable than at national level. Devolution had created a strong incentive for county administrations in Kenya to work out how

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<sup>33</sup> The programme was less successful in its support to sanitation investment, but the focus of this case study is on water service delivery.

<sup>34</sup> Prime Minister’s Office – Regional Administration and Local Government.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p.15.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p.5.

best to listen to citizens and encourage their participation. Meanwhile citizens were already starting to use new legal instruments to push county governments on public participation. Along with continuing support to administrations, to make information available and encourage participation, the task manager described the next step in the process as providing demand-side support for citizen's groups to monitor and evaluate their county's performance while also benchmarking cross-county performances.

### **The inconsistent case KADP was also effective at feeding evidence upwards into policy and programme processes**

In all three sampled cases, evidence generated locally was fed directly into policy and programme processes and contributed to deliver services at scale.

**RGCF/COPE's** and **RWSP's** effectiveness at feeding evidence upwards is already discussed in Section 2.1.3 above. Under **KADP**, information flows from site-specific SAcc projects were fed into county-level governance reform discussions. In contrast to the outcome and impact focus of the above two cases, much of this information related specifically to learning and mainstreaming of 'how to do' SAcc at scale. Hence under KADP Output 2, the programme built in an evidence-feeding element with the planned publication of the synthesis study that was produced to strengthen SAcc measures at national and county levels. Accompanying policy briefs – designed to distil the key findings, lessons and recommendations from the synthesis paper into operationally relevant and timely information and guidance to counties – were presented at regional forums to county officials. The DFID 2014 Annual Review reported additional success in scaling up governance and SAcc measures in ongoing, and new, IDA-financed projects, which drew on the lessons of governance challenges faced in earlier projects. This was specifically using a citizen consultation manual, which had been developed under the Kenya Health Sector Support Project, and was based on KADP support to the nine pilot health facilities that had been adopted by the Ministry of Health. It had also influenced provisions in the new draft national health policy, and developed a manual on social accountability for health facilities across the country. The DFID 2014 Annual Review also reported scaling up from the Western Kenya Community-Driven Development project funded under the KADP: A 'mapping platform and grievance mechanism'. Partly with KADP support, the Western Kenya Community-Driven Development project was restructured with enhanced governance and SAcc measures, and was feeding learning into a new national community-driven development scaled-up project. Similar governance measures had been adopted in several other projects in the DFID's Kenya portfolio.<sup>37</sup>

### **The inconsistent case KADP was also effective at supporting higher-level legislative and policy change**

The KADP had a clear focus, with a small budget, on the policy 'enabling environment' for accountable service delivery. From the outset, SAcc elements integrated with broader programme support to devolved service delivery under KADP, setting the scene for upscaling SAcc across counties, building on policy openness. The KADP support focused on policy frameworks for transparent and accountable governance. These centred on improving the level and quality of engagement of citizens with county governments through county

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p.11.



performance management systems that included public participation and access to information, backed by legislative review of the minimum legal standards for public participation, accountability and transparency.

The link between an enabling environment for participatory governance and the potential for SAcc to improve service delivery at scale was identified during a key informant interview with a KADP World Bank task manager. The task manager commented on the leverage that the programme’s strategic technical support had provided, contrasting it with localised ‘tactical’ support for SAcc initiatives:

*Devolution (in Kenya) is a gigantic institutional change happening very rapidly. It happens very rarely in most countries that you have that much change in such a short space of time. So our attitude was, wherever we can translate these lessons on accountability, we will have a much bigger bang than if we work with a few NGOs to monitor things (pers. comm., 2 February 2016).*

**The inconsistent case KADP was embedded in a policy process with a longer time scale, thus limiting its contribution to observable improvements in service delivery at scale within the project lifetime**


**KADP** was evaluated as a ‘inconsistent’ case. This was because at the time of this evaluation the programme had not had sufficient time to scale up social accountability beyond the project SAcc pilot areas. The explanatory factors identified above all applied to KADP too and it is likely that the project would also achieve the outcome of improved high-level service delivery (O2). This limited our ability to contrast consistent to inconsistent cases and identify causal factors that explain why the outcome was achieved in some cases, but not in others.

Hence while the narrative analysis points to additional explanations for achieving improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery, the utility of the KADP as an inconsistent case for comparative analysis was limited.

While the hypothesis is rejected, the narrative analysis provides illustrative evidence that improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2) can be achieved when SAcc processes are embedded in policy or programme frameworks and evidence is channelled upwards into these processes as part of support to higher-level legislative and policy change. However, the evidence is not strong enough to develop a refined theory.

Figure 2.2 illustrates this schematically and references the relevant case studies.


**Figure 2.2: Hypothesis 1 case studies**



## 2.2 Hypothesis 2a: Citizen engagement for improved local-level service delivery

### 2.2.1 Summary findings for hypothesis 2a

Focus Area 1: The 'accountability trap' – Hypothesis 2a	
<b>Hypothesis</b>	<p><b>Hypothesis 2a:</b> Mechanisms supporting a mix of formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2) and informal (uninvited) citizen engagement (IO4) are more likely to contribute to improved local-level (project area) service delivery (O1).</p> <div style="text-align: center; margin-top: 10px;"> <pre> graph LR     A[Supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement] -- "+" --&gt; B[Supporting informal (uninvited) citizen engagement]     B -- "→" --&gt; C[Improved local-level (project area) service delivery]                     </pre> </div>
<b>QCA finding</b>	<p>Hypothesis 2a was found to be ambivalent. The wording of the hypothesis suggests a likelihood of sufficiency or necessity relationship which was tested using QCA.</p> <p>The model only includes two unsuccessful cases in total. The ratio of cases presenting the outcome to the total number of cases is 95% and therefore above the insignificance threshold established in the methodology section.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>The QCA finding for this hypothesis is ambivalent due to the lack of unsuccessful cases in the model.</b></p>
<b>Narrative analysis finding</b>	<p>Overall, the narrative analysis confirms a key role for formal citizen engagement (IO2) in improving local service delivery. Narrative analysis further identifies complementary roles for informal citizen engagement (IO4) in contributing to these improvements. The narrative analysis also adds a contributing factor (support to skilled facilitators with close community links) and a risk factor (supply-side resource and capacity constraints) for achieving the outcome of improved local-level (project area) service delivery (O1).</p> <p>While the hypothesis is ambivalent, the narrative analysis provides illustrative evidence that <b>supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2) can result in improved local-level (project area) service delivery, with informal (uninvited) citizen engagement and support to skilled facilitators with close community links playing a reinforcing role. Supply-side resource and capacity constraints appear to be the main risks.</b></p>



### 2.2.2 Testing the hypothesis

This section explains in detail how the hypothesis was tested through the application of QCA. Given that the hypothesis indicates likelihood of sufficiency or necessity, its validity is tested through comparing its parameters of fit with competing models. ‘Competing models’ in this context means alternative configurations of the conditions specified in the hypothesis. We establish whether the evidence confirms or rejects the hypothesis, based on the criteria identified in the methodology section of this report.

#### **Hypothesis 2a: Mechanisms supporting a mix of formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2) and informal (uninvited) citizen engagement (IO4) are more likely to contribute to improved local-level (project area) service delivery (O1)**

##### Hypothesis ambivalent

In QCA terms, the hypothesis posits that the combination of formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2) and informal (uninvited) citizen engagement (IO4) is more likely to be sufficient or necessary for achieving improved local-level (project area) service delivery (O1) than competing models.

On the one hand, the hypothesis is rejected: The combination is sufficient with a sufficiency consistency of 100% (21 out of 21 cases)<sup>38</sup> and a sufficiency coverage of 54% (21 out of 39 cases). However, supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2) as a single condition is sufficient as well as necessary. With a sufficiency consistency of 100% (36 out of 36 cases)<sup>39</sup> and a sufficiency coverage of 92% (36 out of 39), IO2 is more efficient at achieving the outcome than the combination of IO2 and IO4.

<sup>38</sup> Significance: 99+%.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

With a sufficiency consistency of 100% (22 out of 22 cases)<sup>40</sup> and a sufficiency coverage of 56% (22 out of 39 cases), supporting informal (uninvited) citizen engagement (IO4) as a single condition is also sufficient but not necessary. When comparing IO2 and IO4 as single conditions, IO2 was more efficient at achieving improved local-level service delivery, highlighting the importance of formal citizen engagement in projects targeted at the local-level.

In the small number of cases with no formal or informal citizen engagement (4 cases) only half achieved success in improving local service delivery, with only two unsuccessful cases in total.

On the other hand, the model only includes two unsuccessful cases in total. The ratio of cases presenting the outcome to the total number of cases is 95% and therefore above the insignificance threshold established in the methodology section. The hypothesis remains ambivalent and we are not able to provide a conclusive test result.

Table 2.4 shows the distribution of cases for each tested configuration.

**Table 2.4: QCA analysis of competing models for hypothesis 2a**

<b>Mechanisms</b>	<b>Outcome: Project-level service delivery improved (O1)</b>		
Number of cases in this model: 41	<b>Present</b>	<b>Absent</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>IO2 and IO4 both present</b>	21	0	21
<b>IO2 present (IO4 absent)</b>	15	0	15
<b>IO4 present (IO2 absent)</b>	1	0	1
<b>IO2 and IO4 both absent</b>	2	2	4
<b>Mechanisms</b>	<b>Outcome: Project-level service delivery improved (O1)</b>		
Number of cases in this model: 41	<b>Present</b>	<b>Absent</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>IO2 present (as a single condition)</b>	36	0	36
<b>IO2 absent (as a single condition)</b>	3	2	5
<b>Mechanisms</b>	<b>Outcome: Project-level service delivery improved (O1)</b>		
Number of cases in this model: 41	<b>Present</b>	<b>Absent</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>IO4 present (as a single condition)</b>	22	0	22

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

Mechanisms	Outcome: Project-level service delivery improved (O1)		
IO4 absent (as a single condition)	17	2	19

### 2.2.3 The QCA finding for this hypothesis is ambivalent due to the lack of unsuccessful cases in the model. Illustrating the hypothesised causal mechanisms

Due to the lack of unsuccessful cases, no inconsistent case was identified. The following case studies were selected:<sup>41</sup>

- Consistent case (modal): RGCF/COPE Bangladesh, 2004–16, (#113976)
- Consistent case (outlier): Support to Healthcare Workers Salaries in Sierra Leone, 2010–16 (#201853)

The starting point for the narrative analysis is the ambivalent QCA finding that supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2), informal (uninvited) citizen engagement (IO4) and a combination of both are all sufficient for achieving the outcome of improved local-level (project area) service delivery (O1), with IO2 being the strongest predictor.

Table 2.5 summarises the two consistent case studies and to what extent the sampled projects achieved improved local-level (project area) service delivery (O1).

**Table 2.5: Consistent case summaries for hypothesis 2a**

Consistent case (modal): RGCF/COPE Bangladesh, 2004–16 (#113976)	Consistent case (outlier): Support to Healthcare Workers Salaries in Sierra Leone, 2010–16 (#201853)
<p>The RGCF/COPE programme promoted citizen engagement through collective rights awareness raising and support to mobilisation. The programme was designed to increase access among the poorest and most marginalised citizens to a range of services.</p> <p><b>RGCF/COPE achieved improved local-level (project area) service delivery (O1).</b> The RGCF governance sub-programme achieved the following:<sup>42</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• With the contribution of other activities, the MJF helped establish and support 3,500 health and/or school monitoring committees</li> <li>• Over 23,000 beneficiaries received improved social security</li> <li>• Some 750,000 beneficiaries accessed services in health, education and agricultural extension</li> </ul>	<p>The programme strengthened formal citizen monitoring of local health facilities as part of broader governance support to the implementation of the Government of Sierra Leone's Free Health Care Initiative (FHCI) policy.</p> <p><b>Support to Healthcare Workers Salaries in Sierra Leone achieved improved local-level (project area) service delivery (O1).</b> Support to citizen monitoring contributed to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consolidating the steep uptake in mother and child free health care after the government's FHCI policy announcement in April 2010</li> <li>• Improving staff clinic attendance through instigation of an attendance monitoring system</li> <li>• Improving monitoring of user fee charging of exempt target groups</li> </ul>

<sup>41</sup> See methodology section for details on the selection procedure.

<sup>42</sup> DFID (2013), *RGCF Phase II Project Completion Report*. London: DFID, p.15.

**Supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2) was found to contribute to improved local-level (project area) service delivery (O1)**

Overall, both projects provide illustrative evidence to confirm the contribution of formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2) to improved local-level (project area) service delivery (O1). However, the evidence base is relatively weak and does not allow for an in-depth assessment of the connecting mechanisms.

Bangladesh's **RGCF/COPE** governance sub-programme focused on governance performance monitoring and user-provider platform discussions. Through support to local grantee partners, the programme funded contextually appropriate discussions, for example through public hearings. These discussions were sometimes backed by systematic user feedback, gathered through scorecard-type activity. Programme evaluations confirmed that this type of support empowered citizens to claim entitlements to services. Reports noted that the improvements were often marginal but made a significant difference to the lives of local service users across a range of services. In the case of safety net services, for instance, transfers were small but became more transparently provided and were not captured by non-beneficiaries. This was reported as 'hugely significant': '*safety nets distribution was now fairer and key decisions were made more openly*'.<sup>43</sup>

The **Support to Healthcare Workers Salaries in Sierra Leone** programme focused on a more standardised, strengthened formal citizen monitoring of local health facilities. Citizen engagement under the programme was promoted via the establishment under the programme of a Health for all Coalition (HFAC). This was a network of volunteer citizens who monitored facility-level service delivery. A programme evaluation confirmed the strengthening of social accountability through this coalition activity:

*community accountability was very weak prior to FHCI and has been strengthened somewhat [...] through the work of HFAC, which has monitors in facilities and provides regular monitoring information, both upwards and downwards.*<sup>44</sup>

It is reported that citizen monitoring has improved local facility performance, for instance through increasing staff clinic attendance and ensuring target groups were exempt from user fee charges. A 2012 evaluation of the programme identified the positive contribution of a formal (invited), citizen-led attendance monitoring system approach on increasing staff attendance at health clinics. Although at that point the evaluation lacked evidence of service delivery outcomes, it reported that it was '*highly likely that there will have been some positive impact if staff are now available at their workstations*'.<sup>45</sup> A 2015 impact evaluation annual report further documented increasing equality of access for social and geographically marginalised groups during the project period. It warned that attribution was difficult, describing described the 'probable contribution' of the programme; for example to improved

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<sup>43</sup> DFID (2013), *RGCF Phase II Project Completion Report*. London: DFID.

<sup>44</sup> OPM (2015), *FHCI Impact Evaluation Report*. Oxford: Oxford Policy Management, p.74.

<sup>45</sup> Stevenson, D., Kinyeki, C. and Wheeler, M. (2012), *Evaluation of DFID Support to Healthcare Workers' Salaries in Sierra Leone*. London: DFID Human Development Resource Centre, 7 September, p.2.

antenatal care (ANC) and a 'possible' knock-on contribution to women's empowerment through increased health care access.<sup>46</sup>

### **Supporting informal (uninvited) citizen engagement (IO4) was found to play a supporting role but evidence remains weak**

Overall, examination of the two cases suggests that combining support to formal citizen engagement (IO2) with support to informal citizen engagement (IO4) can increase effectiveness, but is not necessary. However, the evidence base is weak and does not allow for an in-depth assessment of the connecting mechanisms.

The Bangladesh **RGCF/COPE programme** in many instances integrated programme support to citizen action via formal and informal channels of citizen engagement. The effect of this mix was to take the programme contribution to change beyond a narrow service delivery platform to tackle social change more broadly. Informal citizen mobilisation and action tackled wider institutions that underpinned unequal rights and exploitative behaviour. As part of its support to informal citizen engagement, the PMO allocated grants to support broader social campaigns to challenge public and policymaker opinion. Campaigns used social marketing tools that engage and challenge public opinion, including human chains, consultations, meetings, seminars as well as poster and brochure distribution.

- The work of grantee partners under the Workers' Rights sub-programme, for instance, was wide ranging. It included advocacy campaigns, policy advocacy, information campaigns among garment workers, mobilisation, mediation between workers and employers, training middle managers in the factories, establishment of participation committees within ready-made garment factories, formation and registration of trade unions, training trade union leaders and provision of legal aid.
- Under the programme's Dalit rights initiative, the PMO from 2004 started identifying potential partners to raise awareness and promote Dalit rights in Bangladesh. It formed a loose network of 18 NGOs (most of them not official partners) aiming to build collective conscience and capacity among the Dalits and enhance the work of NGOs/community-based organisations (CBOs) working with Dalits on discrimination. Through the project intervention the two largest countrywide Dalit networks, Bangladesh Harijon Oikya Parishad (BHOP) and Bangladesh Dalit Parishad (BDP) were also strengthened and included in the network. With the support of BHOP, BDP, local Dalit organisations/networks took shape and slowly established linkages with local government institutions and service providers to enhance awareness of Dalit and Harijon (cleaners' caste) rights and subsequently increase their access to public services and change social stigmatisation.

The main focus of the **Support to Healthcare Workers Salaries in Sierra Leone** programme was on a single, formal citizen monitoring mechanism established in the shape of the HFAC. HFAC committees were set up to involve local citizens in invited dialogue. This formal strengthening of citizen engagement did, nonetheless, lead to some reported 'spin-off' informal citizen action, for example through local radio phone-ins and individual calls to local

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<sup>46</sup> OPM (2014), *Sierra Leone FHCI Evaluation: Annual Report*. Oxford: OPM, pp.140–43.

officials. This informal activity was not well evaluated, however, so the evidence on its contribution is somewhat anecdotal.

#### **2.2.4 Looking for explanations**

This section looks beyond the hypothesised relationships to explore other explanations for the achievement of improved local-level (project area) service delivery (O1).

##### **Support to skilled facilitators with close community links was found to be important to sustain local mobilisation and dialogue**

The **Bangladesh RGCF/COPE** programme has worked through skilled local facilitators. These have professional credibility in their respective fields and long-term, collaborative engagement with local citizen groups. In the area of land rights, for instance, a COPE partner, Uttaran, is staffed by skilled mobilisers, often with a legal background. The mobilisers provide legal aid education on the laws of the *khas* land and help citizen groups to navigate their way through the claims process. A focus on building the capacity of local facilitation was evaluated as 'a key part of RGCF success'.<sup>47</sup> This impact was achieved through both organisational capacity building and organisational networking. Organisations were strengthened through a hierarchical process of capacity building. This involved local grantee partners being trained in different aspects of organisational development under the programme. These partners in turn supported smaller local CBOs to build and sustain their capacity. Networking was supported by bringing together both grantee and non-grantee partners at key moments to reflect on their achievements, share best practice and organise networked advocacy events. A notable example of programme networking model was the support provided for a network around Dalit rights. Once built, the network was able to engage with local government and service providers. This increased access to public services for Dalits while challenging the underlying social stigmatisation of this marginalised group. This networking approach lent itself to the country context of vibrant civil society movements.

By contrast, in the case of the **Support to Healthcare Workers Salaries in Sierra Leone** programme, investment in local processes was weak and unsustainable. A programme evaluation noted this underinvestment in local facilitation. It reported that the citizen monitoring coalition (the HFAC) '*has limited resources and capacity to fulfil its mandate*'<sup>48</sup> Furthermore, it was widely perceived as a donor-imposed network rather than as a 'bottom-up' initiative built on close community links. Later project reports expressed concerns over the sustainability of this volunteer network, with its weak capacity and lack of resourcing. In a key informant interview, a colleague involved in the impact evaluation reported that the network was more clearly defined by its high-level profile and leadership personality than by its community embeddedness. Apparently an opportunity was lost to use local facilitators embed 'real-time' data from local oversight into facility-level problem-solving discussions and thus build and sustain citizen engagement.

##### **The contribution of strengthened SAcc to improved service delivery was nonetheless put at risk by supply-side resource and capacity constraints**

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<sup>47</sup> DFID (2012) *RGCF Project Completion Review*. London: DFID.

<sup>48</sup> OPM (2015), op. cit.




Evaluative reporting of the **Bangladesh RGCF/COPE programme** flagged that these service delivery gains were put at risk by the undermining effect on SAcc relations of turnover among officials and staff.

Similarly, reporting on the **Support to Healthcare Workers Salaries in Sierra Leone programme** warned that sustaining citizen engagement for SAcc was difficult in a context of scarce resources and inefficient systems. The main guarantor for predictable financing of service delivery in the FHCI programme was a performance fund; however, it stopped functioning for a year due to the Ebola outbreak. As a result, facilities remained vulnerable to poorly functioning supply and distribution systems. This was characterised by the programme impact evaluation coordinator as a ‘push’ system. Facilities pushed district administrations to deliver medicines. However, with a chronic shortage of transport and fuel, supplies often arrived late and in insufficient quantities.



While the hypothesis is ambivalent, the narrative analysis provides illustrative evidence that **supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2) can result in improved local-level (project area) service delivery, with informal (uninvited) citizen engagement and support to skilled facilitators with close community links playing a reinforcing role. Supply-side resource and capacity constraints appear to be the main risks.** Figure 2.4 illustrates this schematically and references the relevant case studies.

**Figure 2.4: Hypothesis 2a case studies**




## 2.3 Hypothesis 2b: Citizen engagement for improved high-level service delivery

### 2.3.1 Summary findings for hypothesis 2b

Focus Area 1: The 'accountability trap' – Hypothesis 2b	
<b>Hypothesis</b>	<p><b>Hypothesis 2b:</b> Mechanisms supporting a mix of formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2) and informal (uninvited) citizen engagement (IO4) are more likely to contribute to improved higher-level service delivery (O2).</p>  <pre> graph LR     A[Supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement] -- "+" --&gt; B[Supporting informal (uninvited) citizen engagement]     B -- "→" --&gt; C[Improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery]                     </pre>
<b>QCA finding</b>	<p>Hypothesis 2b was rejected. The wording of the hypothesis suggests a likelihood of sufficiency or necessity relationship which was tested using QCA.</p> <p>The combination was far less predictive of successful improvements in higher-level service delivery (O2) than local-level service delivery (O1). The combination is neither necessary nor sufficient and has a sufficiency consistency of 38% (8 out of 21 cases) and a sufficiency coverage of 73% (8 out of 11 cases). Supporting of formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2) as a single condition is not sufficient neither with a sufficiency consistency of 31% (11 out of 35 cases) and a sufficiency coverage of 100% (11 out of 11 cases). This is also the case for supporting informal (uninvited) citizen engagement (IO4) as a single condition, with a sufficiency consistency of 38% (8 out of 21 cases) and a sufficiency coverage of 73% (8 out of 11 cases).</p> <p><b>None of the conditions in the model nor their combination was found to be sufficient for achieving improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2). However, supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2) as a single condition is necessary for achieving the outcome.</b></p>  <pre> graph LR     A[Supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement] -- "→" --&gt; B[Improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery]                     </pre>
<b>Narrative analysis finding</b>	<p>Overall, the narrative analysis confirms the QCA finding and provides illustrative evidence for additional explanatory factors. These include supporting informal (uninvited citizen engagement), civil society networking and institutionalisation of citizen engagement<sup>49</sup>.</p>

<sup>49</sup> Light teal indicates that a condition was identified through the narrative analysis and is illustrative only. Boxes with dark purple and dark teal stripes indicate that a condition was identified through both QCA and the narrative analysis.



### 2.3.2 Testing the hypothesis

This section explains in detail how the hypothesis was tested through the application of QCA. Given that the hypothesis indicates a likelihood of sufficiency or necessity, its validity is tested through comparing its parameters of fit with competing models (alternative configurations of these same conditions). We establish whether the evidence confirms or rejects the hypothesis, based on the criteria identified in the methodology section of this report.

**Hypothesis 2b: Mechanisms supporting a mix of formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2) and informal (uninvited) citizen engagement (IO4) are more likely to contribute to improved higher-level service delivery (O2)**

#### Hypothesis rejected

In QCA terms, the hypothesis posits that the combination of formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2) and informal (uninvited) citizen engagement (IO4) is more likely to be sufficient or necessary for achieving improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2) than competing models. This is rejected.

The combination was far less predictive of successful improvements in higher-level service delivery (O2) than local-level service delivery (O1). The combination is neither necessary nor sufficient and has a sufficiency consistency of 38% (8 out of 21 cases) and a sufficiency coverage of 73% (8 out of 11 cases).

Supporting of formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2) as a single condition is also not sufficient. This generates a sufficiency consistency of 31% (11 out of 35 cases) and a sufficiency coverage of 100% (11 out of 11 cases). Similarly, supporting informal (uninvited) citizen engagement (IO4) as a single condition is not sufficient. This generates a sufficiency consistency of 38% (8 out of 21 cases) and a sufficiency coverage of 73% (8 out of 11 cases). However, supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2) as a single condition is necessary<sup>50</sup> and therefore more likely to contribute to achieving the outcome.

When formal (IO2) and informal (IO4) citizen engagement are both absent (in four cases), improved higher-level service delivery is never achieved.

Table 2.6 shows the distribution of cases for each tested configuration.

<sup>50</sup> Significance: 99+%.

**Table 2.6: QCA analysis of competing models for hypothesis 2b**

Mechanisms	Outcome: Higher-level service delivery improved (O2)		
Number of cases in this model: 39	Present	Absent	Total
<b>IO2 and IO4 both present</b>	8	13	21
<b>IO2 present (IO4 absent)</b>	3	11	14
<b>IO4 present (IO2 absent)</b>	0	0	0
<b>IO2 and IO4 both absent</b>	0	4	4
Mechanisms	Outcome: Higher-level service delivery improved (O2)		
Number of cases in this model: 39	Present	Absent	Total
<b>IO2 present (as a single condition)</b>	11	24	35
<b>IO2 absent (as a single condition)</b>	0	4	4
Mechanisms	Outcome: Higher-level service delivery improved (O2)		
Number of cases in this model: 39	Present	Absent	Total
<b>IO4 present (as a single condition)</b>	8	13	21
<b>IO4 absent (as a single condition)</b>	3	15	18

None of the conditions in the model nor their combination was found to be sufficient for achieving improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2). However, supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2) as a single condition is necessary for achieving the outcome.

Following the QCA finding, our revised theory looks as in Figure 2.5.

**Figure 2.5: QCA revised theory for hypothesis 2b**



### 2.3.3 Illustrating the hypothesised causal mechanisms

The following section illustrates how the hypothesised causal mechanism manifests itself in practice in the consistent case study.<sup>51</sup> The following consistent case study was selected:

- Consistent case (modal): Partnership for Transforming Health Systems 2 Nigeria, 2008–14 (#104229)

The starting point for the narrative analysis is the overall QCA finding that support to formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2) is most important to achieve improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2).

Table 2.7 summarises the consistent case study and to what extent the sampled project achieved improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2):

**Table 2.7: Consistent case summary for hypothesis 2b**

Consistent case (modal): Partnership for Transforming Health Systems (PATHS) 2 Nigeria, 2008–14 (#104229)
<p>PATHS 2 is a horizontal health systems strengthening project to improve the financing, planning and delivery of sustainable, replicable, pro-poor health services for common health problems in Nigeria.</p> <p><b>PATHS 2 achieved improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2).</b> There were significant increases in the proportion of births attended by skilled birth attendants, in the percentage of children with diarrhoea receiving oral rehydration solution, and in the proportion of satisfied clients.</p> <p>Furthermore, a modelling study indicates that PATHS 2 contributed to saving between 117,703 and 185,497 lives over the 6 years from 2008 and 2014 respectively using the Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey and PATHS 2 data.</p>

Overall, the consistent case provides illustrative evidence in support of the original hypothesis. PATHS 2 shows that a combination of formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2) and informal (uninvited) citizen engagement can contribute to improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2).

#### **Formal (invited) citizen engagement (IO2) was found to contribute to improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2) but evidence remains weak**

**PATHS 2** had a clear focus on strengthening formal citizen engagement in Output 4 of the project. The most important element was arguably the establishment of over 2,000 Facility Health Committees (FHCs) across five states in Nigeria.

These FHCs were found to be functional and meeting good standards in operational areas. When surveying citizens in the relevant areas, a steadily increasing majority of respondents felt that FHCs contributed to an improvement in health facility services and that most FHC efforts resulted in some response of government and health facilities.<sup>52</sup> This provides quantitative, perception-based evidence on the role of IO2 to improve service delivery at scale.

<sup>51</sup> Originally, two consistent cases were selected in line with our proposed methodology. However, the CLUF project was recoded following the narrative analysis and then categorised as an inconsistent case as described below.

<sup>52</sup> PATHS 2 (2014), 'Empowering Communities. Saving Lives. Transforming Health Systems in Nigeria', Annual Report, September, p.96.

However, PATHS 2 reporting does not provide further evidence but only success stories from the local level.

### **Informal (uninvited) citizen engagement (IO4) was found to contribute to improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2)**

**PATHS 2** also provided significant support to informal citizen engagement in the form of assisting CSO advocacy partnerships at the state level. Some of the results achieved by these groups indicate improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery, including:

- 'Steps have been taken towards effective implementation of the Free Maternal and Child Health project of government in Kaduna, Kano and Jigawa.
- There has been increased budgetary allocation for free care services in PATHS 2 states in the north.
- More facilities including primary health clinics now provide free services to pregnant women and children under 5 years old.
- In Lagos, CSOs have been included as part of monitoring team for the State House of Assembly oversight visits. This resulted from advocacy to the House to present the findings from an assessment of MMR [maternal mortality rate] in some selected local government authorities.<sup>53</sup>

The evidence presented above illustrates the utility of supporting both formal and informal citizen engagement to improve higher-level service delivery. In the case of PATHS 2, there is some evidence that the two approaches are mutually reinforcing each other.

CSOs engaged in advocacy benefited from their partnerships with FHCs and the community scorecard to improve their legitimacy and use direct citizen feedback for their advocacy campaigns. Invited participation in the Medium-Term Sector strategy process provided CSOs with a seat at the table, which further enhanced their ability to influence decision making. On the other hand, FHCs benefited from CSOs to feed their views upwards.

#### **2.3.4 Looking for explanations**

This section looks beyond the hypothesised relationships to explore other explanations for the achievement of improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery (O2). Given that QCA rejected the initial hypothesis and led to a revised theory, the focus of the narrative analysis is to further test and explain the hypothesised causal claim. In addition, the interrogation of the two inconsistent cases, summarised in Table 2.8, is sought to help achieve a deeper understanding of the causal mechanisms at play.<sup>54</sup> The inconsistent cases, Foundation for Civil Society Programme (FCSP) and Community Land Use Fund Mozambique (CLUF), displayed the hypothesised causal mechanism but did not achieve the outcome

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid., p.108.

<sup>54</sup> See methodology section for details on the selection procedure.

**Table 2.8: Inconsistent case summary for hypothesis 2b**

Inconsistent case (modal): Foundation for Civil Society Programme, Tanzania, 2008–15 (#113540)	Inconsistent case (outlier): Community Land Use Fund Mozambique, 2006–14 (#103993)
<p>The Tanzania <b>FCSP</b> awarded multiple small grant sub-projects on a competitive basis to NGOs/CSOs working on demand-side citizen awareness raising and CSO capacity building. The FCSP successfully funded formal and informal citizen engagement in local SAcc processes, with improvements in project-level service delivery documented. Citizen engagement in monitoring and advocacy activities included local public expenditure tracking surveys/SAcc mechanisms (PETS/SAM) budget tracking and transparency initiatives. Support to formal SAcc mechanisms included forest management committees, land tribunals and older people’s councils. Informal engagement was supported in the form of media oversight and interactive radio projects. Despite many instances of local success, however, programme evaluations did not find that these multiple small project grants had collectively contributed to an improvement of service delivery at scale.</p>	<p>The Mozambique <b>CLUF</b> project aimed to secure community rights over land and other natural resources. Under the programme, SAcc processes worked successfully to improve land titling service delivery in project communities.</p> <p>Some 300,000 land titles were claimed across project sites. Without policy and resource commitment, however, delivery at scale was held back by financial constraints.</p>

The available evidence does not allow for an in-depth assessment of the causal mechanisms at play. It appears, however, that vertical linkages through civil society networking and institutionalisation are the main difference between the case that has achieved the outcome (PATHS 2) and cases that have not (FCSP and CLUF).

### **A key difference was civil society networking**

Our comparison of consistent and inconsistent cases under this hypothesis revealed that formally institutionalised civil society networking can promote at-scale service delivery improvements. We interpreted this as a key difference between the consistent and inconsistent cases.

**PATHS 2** promoted civil society networking. The FHCs established ‘FHC alliances’ with local CSOs to strengthen and sustain ‘horizontal networks’ of citizen participation in local government authorities’ health facility decision making. Evaluative reporting found that building partnerships between FHCs and CSOs was a very effective approach, essential for providing FHCs with the necessary weight to influence decision making.<sup>55</sup> The programme also supported citizen groups to introduce evidence and participate in state medium-term sector strategy discussions, with impressive outcomes in free health care provision described above.

<sup>55</sup> PATHS 2 (n.d.), *Technical Brief: Strengthening Voice and Accountability in the Health Sector*, p.7.

Under the 'inconsistent case' Tanzania **FCSP**, encouragement of CSO coalition building for policy advocacy was demand driven. The project did not proactively promote civil society networking but expected coalitions to emerge more organically:

*Actively facilitating the creation of CSO coalitions may seem to be a logical, attractive strategy to amplify demand. However, creating a space for CSOs to meet, find common causes and for coalitions to emerge organically, may be an equally effective and sustainable strategy for mobilising public demand for improved service delivery, alongside supporting spontaneous movements that emerge in the public space (and on social networking sites).<sup>56</sup>*

In contrast to PATHS 2 and FCSP, the 'inconsistent case' **CLUF** project did not aim to strengthen networking, either proactively or organically. The project maintained a localised focus on a community-by-community 'social preparation' process. This involved the formation of Community Natural Resource Management Committees. The social preparation involved project partner service providers in engaging and sensitising communities to the value of their land as an economic asset, as well as its customary purpose and tenure entitlement. This was geared towards supporting citizen engagement to secure local land titling rather than on networking or vertical integration for higher-level service delivery ambitions.

### **Success was also explained by institutionalising formal SAcc processes**

Institutionalised coordination was another key difference between the consistent and inconsistent cases and can explain the differences in outcome achievement.

Under **PATHS 2**, the establishment of 2,000 FHCs across five states was coordinated out of institutional homes in state governments. Specifically, during Year 5 of the programme a sustainability focus increased emphasis on improving Community Participation in Health (CPH) Policy Guidelines and a FHC Institutionalisation Framework. In its Annual Report the programme reported that two of the five states had developed specific policy guidelines that institutionalised FHCs.

*As a result of PATHS2 work, Kaduna and Jigawa State governments now have CPH policy guidelines and a FHC framework institutionalised in the health sector at the state and LGA levels. This policy ensures the role of FHCs in ensuring citizen participation in improving health services is formally recognized. In addition, it encourages stakeholders, including donor organisations, to engage with FHCs. The CPH policy also helped to identify institutional homes that would support FHCs. In Kaduna this is the SMoLG [State Ministries of Local Government], whereas in Jigawa this is the Gunduma Health Council.<sup>57</sup>*

The programme identified working with officials in these two states during its extension phase to 'further equip them to take over the institutionalisation process of FHCs in the states'.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> DFID (2015), *FCSP Project Completion Report*. London: DFID, p.41.

<sup>57</sup> PATHS 2 (2014), 'Empowering Communities. Saving Lives. Transforming Health Systems in Nigeria', Annual Report, September, pp.97–8.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid*, p. 113.




In contrast, neither **FCSP** nor **CLUF** institutionalises SAcc coordination. The Tanzania FCSP did not purposefully attempt this form of institutionalisation, remaining a strongly demand-side initiative driven by small and many grants, with limited scope or ambition for institutionalisation. In contrast, while the Mozambique CLUF retained a project-funded, ‘community-by-community’ approach during its first phase, the expectation of institutionalised scaling up was nonetheless built into project design and thus remains achievable in the longer term. This would be supported by a planned renewed phase of funding. This longer-term institutionalisation has been increased by the project’s focus on macro-level governance mechanisms, specifically a successor National Land Foundation, a model endorsed by the project’s National Advisory Committee. In 2014 this foundation was awaiting government ministerial approval before it could be legally created. It was expected that donors would cover 100% of the costs in the first 3 years. Thereafter, it was anticipated that it would become self-financing, with administrative costs being covered from revenues generated by the income of service providers from their customers, including government and private sector contributions.

Overall, the narrative analysis confirms the QCA finding and provides illustrative evidence for additional explanatory factors. These include supporting informal (uninvited citizen engagement), civil society networking and institutionalisation of citizen engagement.

Figure 2.6 illustrates this schematically and references the relevant case studies.

**Figure 2.6: Hypothesis 2b and case studies**



### 3 Findings under Focus Area 2: Socially inclusive service delivery


The second focus area for analysis is on socially inclusive service delivery (the ‘for whom?’ question). Under this focus area, we examine combinations of social accountability mechanisms that are hypothesised to be associated with improved service delivery for marginalised social groups.

**Hypothesis 3** focuses on strategies to reach marginalised social groups and make sure that service delivery improvements include them. The hypothesis posits that combining awareness raising with support to ‘socially inclusive local, deliberative platforms’ is effective in improving service delivery for such groups. Socially inclusive local deliberative platforms are understood as formal discussion platforms that bring service providers or local officials together with service users, and include a mechanism, such as a gender quota, to ensure that marginalised social groups participate in the deliberation.


**Hypothesis 4** focuses more specifically on the intermediate outcome of increased participation of marginalised social groups in local platforms. It posits that successfully building this participation will make service delivery more socially inclusive.

#### 3.1 Summary findings for hypotheses 3 and 4

Focus Area 2: Socially inclusive service delivery	
<b>Hypotheses</b>	<p><b>Hypothesis 3:</b> Awareness raising (M4) and supporting socially inclusive platforms (M6) result in improved services for marginalised social groups (O3)</p> <div style="text-align: center; margin: 10px 0;"> <pre> graph LR     A[Supporting socially inclusive platforms] -- "+" --&gt; B[Awareness raising]     B -- "→" --&gt; C[Improved services for marginalised groups]                     </pre> </div> <p><b>Hypothesis 4:</b> Combining support to socially inclusive local platforms (M6) with increased participation by marginalised social groups (IO3) results in improved services for marginalised social groups (O3)</p> <div style="text-align: center; margin: 10px 0;"> <pre> graph LR     A[Supporting socially inclusive platforms] -- "+" --&gt; B[Increased participation by marginalised groups]     B -- "→" --&gt; C[Improved services for marginalised groups]                     </pre> </div>
<b>QCA finding</b>	<p>Hypothesis 3 and 4 are confirmed. The wording of the hypotheses suggests a sufficiency relationship which was tested using QCA.</p> <p>In the analysis of both hypotheses, supporting socially inclusive platforms (M6) was found to be sufficient by itself and awareness raising (M4) was found to be necessary by itself.</p>

	<p>In combination with awareness raising (M4) a higher sufficiency consistency score (95% instead of 90%, i.e. 19 out of 20 cases) but a lower sufficiency coverage score (71% instead of 75%, i.e. 20 out of 28 cases) are achieved. Combining support to socially inclusive platforms with increased participation by marginalised groups is also sufficient but has a lower sufficiency consistency score (90% instead of 91%, i.e. 19 out of 21 cases) and sufficiency coverage score (72% instead of 79%, i.e. 21 out of 29 cases) than just support to socially inclusive platforms, and therefore weakens the model and does not add to the explanation.</p> <p><b>Overall, looking across hypothesis 3 and 4, it is support to socially inclusive local platforms (M6) which is most important to achieve improved services for marginalised social groups (O3), with awareness raising (M4) playing a supporting role.</b> The outcome is achieved whether increased participation by marginalised groups occurs or not. Following the QCA finding, our revised theory looks as follows:</p>  <pre> graph TD     A[Awareness raising] --&gt; B[Supporting socially inclusive platforms]     B --&gt; C[Improved services for marginalised groups]     </pre>
<p><b>Narrative analysis finding</b></p>	<p>The narrative analysis of the two consistent cases provide partial evidence in support of the QCA finding. The two cases confirm that there is a link between support to socially inclusive platforms (M6) and improved services for marginalised groups (O3) with a supporting role of awareness raising (M4). Narrative analysis also confirms that increased participation by marginalised groups (IO3) is a likely driver of improved outcomes for these groups. However, the evidence base is weak and does not allow for an in-depth assessment of the connecting mechanisms.</p> <p>A deeper exploration of explanations indicate that an enabling policy environment can be an important contributing factor for socially inclusive platforms to be established. However, a conducive policy environment was observed both in consistent and inconsistent case(s) and cannot explain why improved services for marginalised groups were achieved in PATHS 2 and RMND<sup>59</sup> but not in the Drivers of Accountability Programme (DAP). Instead, the main difference was that the inconsistent case DAP did not support complementary targeted supply-side measures. The illustrative case study evidence suggests that <b>translating socially inclusive social accountability into improved service delivery relies on complementary targeted supply-side measures in some cases, but not in others.</b></p>

<sup>59</sup> Reducing Maternal and Neonatal Deaths in Rural South Africa Through the Revitalisation of Primary Health Care.



### 3.2 Testing the hypotheses

This section explains in detail how the hypotheses were tested through the application of QCA. Given that both hypotheses suggest a sufficiency relationship, their validity is tested through parameters of fit in relation to sufficiency. For each hypothesis we establish whether the evidence confirms or rejects the hypothesis, based on the criteria identified in the methodology section of this report. Given the close links between the two hypotheses and the common evidence base,<sup>60</sup> we also look across the QCA findings for each hypothesis and identify an overarching QCA finding in relation to focus area 2.

#### **Hypothesis 3: Awareness raising (M4) and supporting socially inclusive platforms (M6) result in improved services for marginalised social groups (O3)**

##### Hypothesis confirmed

In QCA terms, the hypothesis posits that the combination of awareness raising (M4) and supporting socially inclusive platforms (M6) is sufficient for achieving improved services for marginalised groups (O3). This is confirmed. The combination is sufficient<sup>61</sup> but not necessary and has a sufficiency coverage of 71% (20 out of 28 cases) and sufficiency consistency of 95% (19 out of 20 cases).

In the cluster of four cases where both these mechanisms were absent there is only one case (25%) with improved services for marginalised groups. Supporting socially inclusive platforms

<sup>60</sup> The Hamming distance calculation resulted in the same three cases being sampled for both hypotheses.

<sup>61</sup> With a sufficiency-consistency score of 95%, the combination is above our threshold of 90% as established in the methodology section.

(M6) as a single condition is also sufficient<sup>62</sup> but not necessary, but with a slightly lower sufficiency consistency score (90%, 19 out of 21 cases) and a slightly higher sufficiency coverage score (75%, 21 out of 28 cases). Awareness raising (M4) as a single condition, on the other hand, is necessary but not sufficient.<sup>63</sup>

Table 3.1 shows the distribution of cases for each tested configuration.

**Table 3.1: QCA analysis of competing models for hypothesis 3**

<b>Mechanisms</b>	<b>Outcome: Improved services for marginalised social groups (O3)</b>		
Number of cases in this model: 40	<b>Present</b>	<b>Absent</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>M4 and M6 both present</b>	19	1	20
<b>M4 present (M6 absent)</b>	8	7	15
<b>M6 present (M4 absent)</b>	0	1	1
<b>M4 and M6 both absent</b>	1	3	4
<b>Mechanisms</b>	<b>Outcome: Improved services for marginalised social groups (O3)</b>		
Number of cases in this model: 40	<b>Present</b>	<b>Absent</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>M4 present (as a single condition)</b>	27	8	35
<b>M4 absent (as a single condition)</b>	1	4	5
<b>Mechanisms</b>	<b>Outcome: Improved services for marginalised social groups (O3)</b>		
Number of cases in this model: 40	<b>Present</b>	<b>Absent</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>M6 present (as a single condition)</b>	19	2	21
<b>M6 absent (as a single condition)</b>	9	10	19

<sup>62</sup> With a sufficiency-consistency score of 90%, the combination is above our threshold of 90% as established in the methodology section. The sufficiency-coverage score is 75%.

<sup>63</sup> With a necessity-consistency score of 96%, the combination is above our threshold of 90% as established in the methodology section.

**Hypothesis 4: Combining support to socially inclusive local platforms (M6) with increased participation by marginalised social groups (IO3) results in improved services for marginalised social groups (O3)**

Hypothesis confirmed

In QCA terms, the hypothesis posits that the combination of support to socially inclusive local platforms (M6) and increased participation by marginalised groups (IO3) is sufficient for achieving improved services for marginalised groups (O3). This is confirmed. The combination is sufficient<sup>64</sup> but not necessary and has a sufficiency coverage of 72 (21 out of 29 cases) and sufficiency consistency of 90% (19 out of 21 cases).

In the cluster of 13 cases where both these mechanisms were absent there were only five cases (38%) with improved services for marginalised groups. Supporting socially inclusive platforms (M6) as a single condition is also sufficient<sup>65</sup> but not necessary. With a sufficiency consistency score of 91% (21 out of 23 cases) and a sufficiency coverage score of 79% (23 out of 29 cases), this is the strongest predictor of the outcome. Increased participation by marginalised groups (IO3) as a single condition, on the other hand, is not necessary nor sufficient.

Table 3.2 shows the distribution of cases for each tested configuration.

**Table 3.2: QCA analysis of competing models for hypothesis 4**

Mechanisms	Outcome: Improved services for marginalised social groups (O3)		
Number of cases in this model: 41	Present	Absent	Total
<b>M6 and IO3 both present</b>	19	2	21
<b>M6 present (IO3 absent)</b>	2	0	2
<b>IO3 present (M6 absent)</b>	3	2	5
<b>M6 and IO3 both absent</b>	5	8	13
Mechanisms	Outcome: Improved services for marginalised social groups (O3)		
Number of cases in this model: 41	Present	Absent	Total
<b>M6 present (as a single condition)</b>	21	2	23
<b>M6 absent (as a single condition)</b>	8	10	18

<sup>64</sup> With a sufficiency-consistency score of 91%, the combination is above our threshold of 90% as established in the methodology section.

<sup>65</sup> With a sufficiency-consistency score of 90%, the combination is above our threshold of 90% as established in the methodology section.


Mechanisms	Outcome: Improved services for marginalised social groups (O3)		
	Present	Absent	Total
Number of cases in this model: 41			
<b>IO3 present (as a single condition)</b>	22	4	26
<b>IO3 absent (as a single condition)</b>	7	8	15

Overall, looking across hypotheses 3 and 4, it is support to socially inclusive local platforms (M6) that is most important for achieving improved services for marginalised social groups (O3), with awareness raising (M4) playing a supporting role. The outcome is achieved whether increased participation by marginalised groups occurs or not (indicating an equally valid pathway to change).

In the analysis of both hypotheses, supporting socially inclusive platforms (M6) was found to be sufficient by itself. In combination with awareness raising (M4) a higher sufficiency consistency score (95% instead of 90%) but a lower sufficiency coverage score (71% instead of 75%) are achieved. Combining support to socially inclusive platforms with increased participation by marginalised groups is also sufficient but has a lower sufficiency consistency score (90% instead of 91%) and sufficiency coverage score (72% instead of 79%) than just support to socially inclusive platforms, and therefore does not add much to the explanation.

Following the QCA finding, our revised theory looks as follows:

**Figure 3.1: QCA revised theory for hypotheses 3 and 4**



### 3.3 Illustrating the hypothesised causal mechanism

Given that QCA confirmed the initial hypotheses and led to a revised theory, the focus of the narrative analysis is to illustrate and explain the hypothesised causal mechanism. The following section illustrates how the hypothesised causal mechanism manifests itself in

practice in the two consistent case studies. The following consistent case studies were selected for both hypotheses:<sup>66</sup>

- Consistent case (modal): Partnership for Transforming Health Systems (PATHS) 2 Nigeria, 2008–14 (#104229)
- Consistent case (outlier): Reducing Maternal and Neonatal Deaths in Rural South Africa Through the Revitalisation of Primary Health Care (RMND), 2011–16 (#202295)

The starting point for the narrative analysis is the overall QCA finding that support to socially inclusive local platforms (M6) is most important to achieve improved services for marginalised social groups (O3), with awareness raising (M4) playing a supporting role.

Table 3.3 summarises the two consistent case studies and to what extent the sampled projects have achieved improved services for marginalised groups (O3).

**Table 3.3: Consistent case summaries for hypotheses 3 and 4**

Consistent case (modal): Partnership for Transforming Health Systems (PATHS) 2 Nigeria, 2008–14 (#104229)	Consistent case (outlier): Reducing Maternal and Neonatal Deaths in Rural South Africa Through the Revitalisation of Primary Health Care (RMND), 2011–16 (#202295)
<p>PATHS 2 is a horizontal health systems strengthening project to improve the financing, planning and delivery of sustainable, replicable, pro-poor health services for common health problems in Nigeria.</p> <p><b>PATHS 2 achieved improved services for marginalised groups (O3), in particular women and children.</b> There were significant increases in the proportion of births attended by skilled birth attendants, in the percentage of children with diarrhoea receiving oral rehydration solution, and in the proportion of satisfied clients. Furthermore, a modelling study indicates that PATHS 2 contributed to saving between 117,703 and 185,497 lives over the 6 years from 2008 and 2014 respectively using the Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS) and PATHS 2 data. Given the strong focus on maternal and child health, these outcome-level achievements were particularly strong for marginalised groups. Moreover, PATHS 2 also went further and specifically targeted poor populations when selecting new project sites.</p>	<p>The RMND South Africa project supported the national strategy for maternal, newborn, child and women’s health and nutrition at national and district levels. The project focused on strengthening both supply and demand for these services.</p> <p><b>RMND achieved improved services for marginalised groups (O3), in particular women and children.</b> Project documentation allows for the comparison of some outcome indicators between the 25 project-supported districts and other South African districts. This provides reasonably robust evidence to measure project achievements. The project achieved clear service delivery improvements in project sites, most importantly in terms of increased access and use of family planning and the number of antenatal first visits before 20 weeks. The Essential Steps in the Management of Obstetric and Neonatal Emergencies (ESMOE) training was also found to have contributed to significant reductions in neonatal death rates and perinatal mortality rates. Given that these services targeted women and children, the service delivery improvements were particularly strong for marginalised groups.</p>

**Socially inclusive platforms (M6) were found to contribute to improved services for marginalised groups (O3) but the evidence remains weak**

<sup>66</sup> See methodology section for details on the selection procedure.



Overall, the two consistent cases provide illustrative evidence in support of the QCA finding. They confirm that there is a link between support to socially inclusive platforms (M6) and improved services for marginalised groups (O3), sometimes via increased participation of marginalised groups (IO3). However, the evidence base is relatively weak and does not allow for an in-depth assessment of the connecting mechanisms.

**PATHS 2** supported socially inclusive platforms in the form of Facility Health Committees (FHCs). FHCs typically consisted of 12 to 15 people who represented communities and worked with facility staff to improve service delivery. To ensure social inclusion, at least four of the members were required to be female, and there were also systematic efforts to include other marginalised groups. Thanks to these efforts, it was reported that about 35% of all trained and actively participating FHC members were women.<sup>67</sup>

One of the FHC's roles was to increase access to services for everyone, including the disadvantaged. It is reported that FHC members actively identified marginalised groups in their communities, encouraged them to use health facilities and investigated barriers that prevent them from using health services. However, it is not clear to what extent a greater share of marginalised groups in FHCs has contributed to better services for marginalised groups. While the evidence is weak, there is strong logical link and it is highly likely that there was some contribution.

In case of **RMND**, supporting socially inclusive platforms was and part of the overall RMND framework for strengthening demand and accountability.<sup>68</sup> Socially inclusive platforms supported by the project included clinic committees, community-based monitoring teams, action groups and other available structures. Marginalised groups were found to be less likely to access services, which is why the project focused on including those groups in local deliberative platforms.<sup>69</sup>

The evaluation of the SAcc component reports that there were examples of clinic committees that managed to address specific barriers to services in their clinic.<sup>70</sup> However, there was only anecdotal evidence about the contribution of socially inclusive platforms to improved serviced delivery. Overall, the evaluation of the social accountability component found that the grantee project was likely to have contributed to improving demand for maternal, newborn, child and women's health and nutrition services.<sup>71</sup> The DFID Project Completion Review (PCR) concluded, however, that the evidence was too weak to assess the project's effect on demand and ultimately on access to services.<sup>72</sup>

#### **Awareness raising (M4) was found to play a supporting role but the evidence remains weak**

Overall, the two consistent cases provide illustrative evidence in support of the QCA finding. They confirm that there is a supporting role for awareness raising (M4) in achieving improved

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<sup>67</sup> PATHS 2 (2014), op. cit., p.100.

<sup>68</sup> RMCH (2015), Strengthening Demand and Accountability for MNCWH Services in South Africa: Implementation Framework at District Level, p.15.

<sup>69</sup> RMCH (2015), op. cit., p.15.

<sup>70</sup> Msunduzi evaluation consortium (2014), 'RMCH Civil Society Organisation Grants Project', Evaluation report, p.ix.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> DFID (2015), op. cit., p.7.

services for marginalised groups (O3). However, the evidence base is weak and does not allow for an in-depth assessment of the connecting mechanisms.

**PATHS 2** also paid considerable attention to raising the awareness of marginalised groups, for instance through informing poor and remote communities about life-saving opportunities created by improvements of health services in their nearest health facility, or targeting women to make informed choices about treatment, prevention and care for maternal health and child diarrhoea. Again, available evidence supporting the link between awareness raising and improved services for marginalised groups is relatively weak. A 2013 study analysing the effect of awareness raising activities remained inconclusive.<sup>73</sup> At the same time, PATHS 2 reports that '*community discussions and interviews strongly support the view that these interventions were very important in building demand for antenatal care and deliveries*',<sup>74</sup> suggesting a supporting role for awareness raising as identified in the QCA finding.

In the case of **RMND**, most of the project's demand-side work also aimed at raising community awareness. One successful initiative was the development and launch of MomConnect, a government programme sending messages to pregnant women and young mothers. Furthermore, many CSOs focused on raising awareness on teenage pregnancy and demand for contraception. However, the evidence base supporting a contribution of awareness raising to improve services for marginalised groups was very weak.

### 3.4 Looking for explanations

This section looks beyond the hypothesised relationships to explore other explanations for the achievement of improved services for marginalised groups (O3). In addition to exploring the consistent cases in greater depth, the interrogation of a positive case is sought to help achieve a deeper understanding of the causal mechanisms at play. The inconsistent case displayed the hypothesised causal mechanism but did not achieve the outcome. The following inconsistent case was selected for both hypotheses:<sup>75</sup>

- Inconsistent case (modal): Drivers of Accountability Programme (DAP) in Kenya, 2010–16 (#200120)

**Figure 3.2: Inconsistent case summary for hypotheses 3 and 4**

Inconsistent case (modal): Drivers of Accountability Programme (DAP), Kenya, 2010–16 (#200120)
<p>DAP aimed at improving the accountability of Kenya's government to its citizens. At subnational level this included providing technical support to county assemblies and empowering citizens.</p> <p>DAP provides several examples of establishing and strengthening socially inclusive platforms (<b>M6</b>) benefiting in particular women and youth.<sup>76</sup> For example, the DAP grantee Forum Syd specifically worked with women and youth in increasing their participation in such local decision-making platforms. In Kisumu, Kakamega and Machako counties, model youth assemblies successfully petitioned their leaders to include women and youth in County Development Fund committees and in Ward Education Bursary Fund committees. Forum Syd also developed the capacity of women and youth to effectively participate in these committees. It is reported that Forum Syd's work also</p>

<sup>73</sup> PATHS 2 (2014), op. cit., p.121.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., p.115.

<sup>75</sup> See methodology section for details on the selection procedure.

<sup>76</sup> DFID Annual Report 2014, p.9.

led to increased participation of young women in decision making at the village level. Similarly, DAP documentation reports that the DAP grantee Centre for Rights Education and Awareness trained women leaders in Nyeri, Meru and Nakuru counties.

DAP grantees also invested significant resources in awareness raising (**M4**) around the new Constitution, devolution and participation in local governance. In 2015, DAP grantee Constitutional Reform and Education Organisation was reported to have reached 6 million citizens in five counties; URAIA 900,000 rural citizens working with 25 CBOs; and Forum Syd over 200,000 citizens in four countries. In 2014, URAIA reported civic education activities with 14.4 million citizens, ACT-Wazi with close to 6 million people, and Makutano indicated reaching 6.5 million citizens through TV episodes.<sup>77</sup>

However, DAP **did not achieve improved services for marginalised groups (O3)**. While a number of examples of improved services were reported, none did directly benefit marginalised groups. Only one instance of increased investments into youth was reported, but on balance the project struggled to improve services for marginalised groups. Overall, DAP reports that devolution has been challenging and has slowed the benefits of reform.<sup>78</sup>

### **An enabling policy environment was found to be a contributing context factor for socially inclusive platforms to be established**

Significantly, it appears that in all three sampled cases there was a policy/legislative environment that enabled socially inclusive platforms. These three sampled cases illustrate how a conducive policy environment could facilitate socially inclusive participation.

In the case of **PATHS 2**, as a result of the project's work, FHCs were institutionalised in a number of Nigerian states, including the provision that at least four members had to be female. In the case of South Africa **RMND**, inclusion and participation were strong government priorities, facilitating a focus on socially inclusive platforms such as the clinic committees supported by the project. In the Kenya **DAP**, participatory governance was strongly embedded in the new Constitution. This stipulated, among other measures, a gender quota for county assemblies. DAP took advantage of this enabling environment to strengthen participation generally and further women's participation in decision making in particular. The 2014 Annual Review of DAP also stated:

*Progress is being made in making service delivery more responsive, especially by increasing citizens' participation in decision-making. A context in which participation has constitutional status has driven the counties to listen to citizens.<sup>79</sup>*

This finding demonstrates the utility of working at the macro level to support the enabling environment, as discussed under focus area 1 of this report. In the case of **PATHS 2**, the project clearly contributed to this effect, while **DAP Kenya** also contributed at this macro level. Hence working between micro and macro levels appeared to be an important cornerstone of effective social accountability in general, and for an effective socially inclusive accountability relationship in particular.

However, a conducive policy environment was observed both in consistent and inconsistent cases and cannot explain why improved services for marginalised groups (O3) were achieved

<sup>77</sup> DFID (2015), Annual Report 2015, pp.3, 9.

<sup>78</sup> DFID (2014), Annual Report 2014. London: DFID, p.1.

<sup>79</sup> DFID (2015), DAP Annual Review. London: DFID, p.11.

in PATHS 2 and RMND but not in DAP. The context factor only provides a partial explanation of how socially inclusive platforms can be established.

We therefore turn to the inconsistent case (DAP) to identify other factors that explain the difference in outcome achievement.

### **The inconsistent case DAP did not support complementary targeted supply-side measures**

In both consistent cases – **Nigeria PATHS 2** and **RMND South Africa** – social accountability was only a component of a larger health sector strengthening project. PATHS 2's intervention model was based on the idea that an integrated approach was needed, which works across health system functions, service delivery and community involvement, and at national, state and local levels. Similarly, but in a more focused way, RMND supported the national strategy for maternal, newborn, child and women's health and nutrition at national and district levels, strengthening both supply and demand for such services. Furthermore, both projects clearly targeted maternal and child health. With significant investments as part of their comprehensive intervention packages, both projects achieved measurable service improvements for women and children.

In both cases, supply-side support was found to be critical to improving services. Indeed, many of the improvements were directly linked to specific supply-side measures, such as the training of health workers in the case of PATHS 2 and the deployment of district clinical specialist teams in the case of RMND. For instance, the ESMOE training component of RMND was found to be associated with significant reductions in death rates:

*LSTM and University of Pretoria are carrying out an impact evaluation of ESMOE, comparing sites that have had saturation training (more than 80% staff trained) with those that have not yet had training as the course gets rolled out nationally. Early analysis of eight districts is available and has showed significant reductions in NNMR [neonatal mortality rate] and MMR.<sup>80</sup>*

Overall, the evidence from PATHS 2 and RMND points to such targeted supply-side measures as an important explanation for improved services for marginalised groups. This seemed to be particularly the case in health sector projects, which tended to have a natural focus on marginalised groups if women and children were included in the definition of such groups.

The 'inconsistent' case of **DAP** provides further insights into this finding. DAP supported an impressive strengthening of subnational participatory governance mechanisms, with counties introducing public participation and access to information frameworks, spurring citizen participation. Mechanisms included technology platforms, regular town hall meetings, budget forms, notice boards and citizen's forums. Furthermore, the project supported the participation of youth and women in county assemblies, Constituency Development Funds committees and in Ward Education Bursary Funds.

However, project reporting provided only one anecdotal piece of evidence of such a process contributing to improved services for marginalised groups (successful youth lobbying for

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<sup>80</sup> DFID (2015), *RMND Project Completion Review*, London: DFID, p.7.


increased investments). In most cases, DAP stopped at improving accountability but did not achieve improved service delivery. This is because DAP was entirely focused on improving accountability and did not include direct supply-side measures, so any service delivery improvements had to occur thanks to a stronger accountability relationship. DAP therefore illustrates the limits of SAcc by itself and the value of working across supply and demand to achieve service delivery improvements.

Therefore, the illustrative narrative analysis evidence suggests that translating socially inclusive social accountability into improved service delivery relies on complementary targeted supply-side measures in some cases, but not in others. Both the support to socially inclusive platforms and to targeted supply-side measures seem to represent functional pathways to achieve the outcome. This finding is backed up by the fact that 20 of the sampled 33 projects that achieved improved services for marginalised groups did not support targeted supply-side measures and achieved such results nevertheless.

However, the available evidence does not allow for an in-depth assessment to understand in which contexts which pathway is more effective. We can only conclude that each pathway is effective in some cases but not in others. Further research is needed to illuminate this finding in more granularity.

Figure 3.3 overleaf illustrates this schematically and references the relevant case studies.

**Figure 3.3: Hypotheses 3 and 4 and case studies**



## 4 Findings under Focus Area 3: Social accountability and the social contract

Under the third focus area, we explore the influence of the social contract context on the contribution of projects to strengthened formal social accountability processes. We compare and contrast project cases with strong and weak social contract contexts to better understand the way that these contexts mediate SAcc processes and outcomes. In this macro evaluation, we define a social contract as the relationship between state service providers and citizen service users in respect of a shared understanding of obligations and entitlements (see Annex B). Through our QCA scoring approach we allocated a binary score of the strength of social contract using a standardised national proxy indicator: the CIVICUS Enabling Environment Index. This index captures three dimensions of the environment for civil society activity (and by extension its relationship with the state): socio-economic environment; socio-cultural environment; and governance environment. It is the third dimension of governance environment that most closely indicates the presence or absence of a social contract in respect of our macro evaluation hypotheses:

*It includes fundamental capabilities that create the minimum preconditions, or lack thereof, for social and political engagement.<sup>81</sup>*

**Hypothesis 5** examines the potential for support to independent citizen action in contexts where a weak social contract might be expected to militate against citizens engaging in formal SAcc platforms. As part of this hypothesis there is an expected role for the media in raising awareness and encouraging public oversight and debates.

**Hypothesis 6** examines demand-side support in the contrasting contexts of strong and weak social contracts. Typically, DFID programming will promote a mix of demand and supply-side processes that are designed to support and strengthen social accountability locally in pursuit of better local services. On the demand side, programmes typically assume that citizens' lack of knowledge of their entitlements and their limited capacity to monitor services are the main hurdles to their participation in the governance of service delivery. By tackling these twin hurdles, the interventions aim to transform relationships between citizens and service providers.

### 4.1 Hypothesis 5: Support to media oversight and informal citizen action in weak social contract contexts

#### 4.1.1 Summary findings for hypothesis 5

Focus Area 3: Social accountability and the social contract – Hypothesis 5	
<b>Hypothesis</b>	<p><b>Hypothesis 5:</b></p> <p>When state-society relations indicate a weak social contract (C4), greater local-level responsiveness (IO1) is best achieved via informal citizen action (IO4) and media oversight (M3).</p>

<sup>81</sup> For a fuller discussion see the CIVICUS Enabling Environment Index Methodological Note at <http://civicus.org/eei/>

	<p>Context: Weak social contract + Supporting media oversight + Supporting informal citizen action → Greater local-level responsiveness</p>
<p><b>QCA finding</b></p>	<p>Hypothesis 5 was confirmed. The wording of the hypothesis indicates a likelihood of sufficiency or necessity relationship, which was tested using QCA.</p> <p><b>The combination suggested by the hypothesis is the most likely to be sufficient or necessary of the models tested.</b> The combination is sufficient but not necessary with a sufficiency consistency of 100% (8 out of 8 cases) and sufficiency coverage of 53% (8 out of 15 cases). Supporting media oversight (M3) as a single condition is not sufficient nor necessary. The same is true for supporting informal citizen action (IO4) as a single condition. In the cluster of four cases where both these mechanisms were absent, the outcome was also always achieved (100% sufficiency consistency), however at a lower sufficient coverage of 27% (4 out of 15 cases).</p> <p>The QCA finding confirms the hypothesis that in the context of a weak social contract (C4), greater local-level responsiveness (IO1) is best achieved via informal citizen action (IO4) and media oversight (M3) rather than if one or both conditions were absent:</p> <p>Context: Weak social contract + Supporting media oversight + Supporting informal citizen action → Greater local-level responsiveness</p>
<p><b>Narrative analysis finding</b></p>	<p>Overall, the narrative analysis confirms the role of media oversight (M3) suggested by QCA, but provides illustrative evidence that in some weak social contract contexts, formal citizen engagement (IO2) can be more important than informal citizen engagement (IO4).</p> <p>Context: Weak social contract + Supporting formal citizen engagement → Greater local-level responsiveness</p> <p>Supporting media oversight and Supporting informal citizen action are shown as additional factors with PPIMA and FSCP checkmarks.</p>

#### 4.1.2 Testing the hypothesis

This section explains in detail how the hypothesis was tested through the application of QCA. Given that the hypothesis indicates likelihood of sufficiency or necessity, its validity is tested through comparing its parameters of fit with competing models (i.e. alternative configurations of the hypothesised conditions in which one or both conditions are absent). We establish

whether the evidence confirms or rejects the hypothesis, based on the criteria identified in the methodology section of this report.

**Hypothesis 5: When state-society relations indicate a weak social contract (C4), greater local-level responsiveness (IO1) is best achieved via informal citizen action (IO4) and media oversight (M3)**

Hypothesis confirmed

In QCA terms, the hypothesis posits that in the context of a weak social contract (c4), the combination of informal citizen action (IO4) and media oversight (M3) is more likely to be sufficient or necessary for achieving greater local-level responsiveness (IO1) than competing models.

The combination is sufficient but not necessary with a sufficiency consistency of 100% (8 out of 8 cases)<sup>82</sup> and sufficiency coverage of 53% (8 out of 15 cases). Supporting media oversight (M3) as a single condition is neither sufficient nor necessary. The same is true for supporting informal citizen action (IO4) as a single condition. In the cluster of four cases where both these mechanisms were absent, the outcome was also always achieved (100% sufficiency consistency);<sup>83</sup> however, at a lower sufficient coverage of 27% (4 out of 15 cases). Therefore, the combination suggested by the hypothesis is the most likely to be sufficient, confirming the hypotheses.

Table 4.1 shows the distribution of cases for each tested configuration.

**Table 4.1: QCA analysis of competing models for hypothesis 5**

Mechanisms	Outcome: Greater local-level responsiveness (IO1)		
	Present	Absent	Total
Number of cases in this model: 19			
<b>M3 and IO4 both present</b>	8	0	8
<b>M3 present (IO4 absent)</b>	0	2	2
<b>IO4 present (M3 absent)</b>	3	2	5
<b>M3 and IO4 both absent</b>	4	0	4

Mechanisms	Outcome: Greater local-level responsiveness (IO1)		
	Present	Absent	Total
Number of cases in this model: 19			

<sup>82</sup> Significance: 99+%.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.



<b>M3 present (as a single condition)</b>	8	2	10
<b>M3 absent (as a single condition)</b>	7	2	9
<b>Mechanisms</b>	<b>Outcome: Greater local-level responsiveness (IO1)</b>		
Number of cases in this model: 19	<b>Present</b>	<b>Absent</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>IO4 present (as a single condition)</b>	11	2	13
<b>IO4 absent (as a single condition)</b>	4	2	6

The QCA finding confirms the hypothesis that in the context of a weak social contract (C4), greater local-level responsiveness (IO1) is best achieved via a combination of informal citizen action (IO4) and media oversight (M3) rather than if one or both conditions were absent.

Our theory therefore remains as before (Figure 4.1).

**Figure 4.1: QCA confirmed theory for hypothesis 5**



### 4.1.3 Illustrating the hypothesised causal mechanisms

Given that QCA confirmed the initial hypotheses, the focus of the narrative analysis is to illustrate and explain the hypothesised causal mechanism. The following section illustrates how the hypothesised causal mechanism manifests itself in practice in the two consistent case studies. The following consistent case studies were selected:<sup>84</sup>

- Consistent case (modal): Foundation for Civil Society Programme (FCSP), Tanzania, 2008–15 (#113540)
- Consistent case (outlier): Public Policy Information Monitoring and Advocacy (PPIMA), Rwanda, 2009–18 (#200318)

<sup>84</sup> See methodology section for details on the selection procedure.

The starting point for the narrative analysis is the QCA finding that in the context of a weak social contract (C4), greater local-level responsiveness (IO1) is best achieved via informal citizen action (IO4) and media oversight (M3).

Table 4.2 summarises the two consistent case studies and to what extent the sampled projects have achieved greater local-level responsiveness (IO1).

**Table 4.2: Consistent case summaries for hypothesis 5**

Consistent case (modal): Foundation for Civil Society Programme, Tanzania, 2008–15 (#113540)	Consistent case (outlier): Public Policy Information Monitoring and Advocacy, Rwanda, 2009–18 (#200318)
<p>The Tanzania FCSP operated in a weak social contract context. The political liberalisation of the early 1990s had failed to translate into meaningful citizen participation during the programme lifetime. The programme awarded multiple small grant sub-projects on a competitive basis to NGOs/CSOs working on demand-side citizen awareness raising and CSO capacity building.</p> <p><b>FCSP achieved greater local-level responsiveness (IO3).</b> FCSP successfully funded formal and informal citizen engagement in local SAcc processes, with improvements in local-level responsiveness such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Mvomero District Development Committee was successfully lobbied to establish the District Education Fund for improving levels of education, specifically targeting female students. As a result, the formed committee is in the process of establishing hostels for girls in each secondary school across the district</li> <li>• Moshi municipal council has incorporated budget for the people with disabilities in the financial year 2014/2015</li> <li>• PETS activity was also carried out in Morogoro in the water sector and on the back of this, the council set aside funds to drill 12 wells</li> </ul>	<p>The Rwanda PPIMA programme operated in a weak social contract context. Political space remained relatively controlled and closed to citizen engagement, despite a progressive policy environment of decentralisation. The programme supported CSOs at national and local level to hold government to account and influence the formulation and implementation of policies and plans.</p> <p><b>PPIMA achieved greater local-level responsiveness (IO3).</b> Successes in local SAcc processes have resulted in documented improvements, for example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In the case of Mpond Wa Cell in Gitoki sector again in Gatsibo district, a scorecard process and interface meeting resulted in the number of depots distributing seeds and fertiliser</li> <li>• In Nyange B Health Centre in Nyange Sector of Ngororero district, service providers made a big effort between the first and second interface meeting to make available specialists – dentists, ophthalmologist and paediatricians – by seeking the support of Muhororo Hospital. The phase 1 evaluation reported that <i>‘three specialists attend the centre one day a week now’</i><sup>85</sup></li> </ul>

<sup>85</sup> Coffey (2015), Mid-Term Review of the Public Policy Information Monitoring and Advocacy Programme, Final Report, p.29.

**Supporting media oversight (M3) was found to play a supporting role, but evidence remains weak.**

Overall, both projects provide illustrative evidence to confirm the supporting role of media oversight (M3) to achieve greater local-level responsiveness (IO1). However, the evidence base is relatively weak and does not allow for an in-depth assessment of the connecting mechanisms.

Purposeful support to independent media oversight was included in the **PPIMA** programme's second phase. This was pursued at national and district levels. Such media engagement included radio call-ins on public services. At the district level, 16 radio call-in-talk shows were rolled out where citizens could air their views on local government and service provider performance. The DFID mid-term review 2015 found:

*The inclusion of a media partner in Phase II has heightened awareness of communication as a development tool and appears to be particularly useful at keeping issues on the agenda.<sup>86</sup>*

While the programme support to media oversight appeared to demonstrate some success in keeping service delivery discussions in the public domain, it maintained a secondary, supporting role. There was much more evidence in programme reporting that the creation of formal citizen platforms and/or supporting citizen evidence gathering, monitoring and feedback had a reported impact on local-level responsiveness delivery, as further discussed in hypothesis 6.

**FCSP's** support to media oversight was part of the programme's mass outreach on citizen rights and awareness raising. The project facilitated the production and airing of 99 interactive radio projects on matters related to the East Africa Community. Listeners could then call into the radio station or comment on social media. It is reported that at least 1,000 listeners participated directly in each radio project by sending in questions through text messages and posting comments on social media platforms, such as Facebook (Annual Review, 2014).

In this way, media in the programme emerged as part of a two-way conversation with the public about rights generally and service delivery issues more specifically. DFID's Annual Review (2014) commented on the potential of media engagement:

*A fast-growing young and urban population and widening access to media through expansion of local FM radio and use of mobile devices are increasingly contributing towards making populations in Tanzania better informed. Local CSOs are positively utilizing these opportunities to better organize citizens and ensure their demands are heard by the state.<sup>87</sup>*

An important contribution of the programme in this changing social context was to focus on awareness raising and the construction of citizenship among populations reached by the programme. The programme made widespread use of media for this type of outreach, including radio, newspapers, television and the dissemination of large numbers of printed

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid, p.2.

<sup>87</sup> DFID (2014), *Tanzania FCSP Annual Review*. London: DFID, p.3.

materials.<sup>88</sup> However, evidence on the specific effect of media oversight on local-level responsiveness is weak.

#### **There is insufficient evidence to assess the role of informal citizen action (IO4)**

The **Tanzania FCSP** worked more broadly on demand-side citizen engagement, with multiple grant making, which supported a wider range of formal and informal citizen action. Indeed, DFID's case for extending the programme beyond 2011 rested on its recognition of the need to keep strengthening civil society to engage with the state to overcome challenges of the weak social contract. However, reporting and evidence on the effects of informal citizen action was equally weak.

**PPIMA** did not purposefully support informal citizen engagement. A DFID key informant described the context as one in which civil society space is closely controlled and managed and independent citizen action is not the norm. This is confirmed by the programme evaluation's own context assessment of ordinary Rwandans as removed from the development process and socially distant from public officials.<sup>89</sup> However, the phase 2 independent mid-term review 2015 noted some 'spin-off' independent citizen action, which may also have contributed to enhanced government responsiveness.<sup>90</sup>

#### **4.1.4 Looking for explanations**

This section looks beyond the hypothesised relationships to explore other explanations for the achievement of greater local-level responsiveness (IO1). No inconsistent case study was available for this hypothesis, so the analysis is restricted to learning from the two consistent cases PPIMA and FCSP.

**Formal citizen engagement (IO2) was found to be the main driver of greater local-level responsiveness (IO1) when sufficient entitlements were associated with service delivery and when limits to freedom of expression and space for informal action constrained informal action as the main driver of SAcc processes.**

Despite the sufficiency relationship observed for informal citizen engagement, the narrative analysis points to a primary role for formal citizen engagement in weak social contract contexts.

Given Rwanda's controlled civil society space and the weak social contract, **PPIMA** primarily focused on formal, mandated, citizen engagement (IO2), most successfully through implementing a community scorecard and related dialogue meetings between citizens and local government or service providers. With government backing and approval, a collaborative arrangement between state and citizen, informed by the scorecard process, was evaluated as both viable and effective. Examples of formal citizen engagement that resulted in greater local-level responsiveness include:

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<sup>88</sup> Ibid, p.6.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid, p.19.

<sup>90</sup> Coffey (2015), Mid-Term Review of the Public Policy Information Monitoring and Advocacy Programme, Final Report, p.2.

- *Umuganda* (voluntary community work) in Ngororero: The issue of excessive *umuganda* was raised in the community scorecard process and the number of days subsequently reduced.
- *Girinka* '1 cow per family' scheme: A local leader gave cows to his friends instead of vulnerable families. This was addressed following community complaints during the community scorecard process.
- Governance improvements (use of *ubudehe* funds for community priority repairs, participation of local leaders in *umuganda*, etc.) with links to the community scorecard process.<sup>91</sup>

These examples illustrate that in the Rwandan context, formal citizen engagement was able to achieve improved local-level responsiveness.

**FCSP** provides further evidence for the value of formal citizen action to achieve greater local-level responsiveness. A few examples of effective formal citizen engagement cited in the Annual Review 2013<sup>92</sup> include:

- One grantee organisation, Tushiriki, established five forest management committees. It was reported that as a result of the running of these committees, ten people between February and May 2014 were taken to the police and had to pay a fine for illegal tree cutting in the forests;
- In Newala, a workshop was conducted by the Newala Farmers Empowerment Project to 61 men and 39 women on sustainable land use plans for agriculture and the land sector. Land tribunals at the village, ward and district levels began involving the community in the implementation of development plans in the agriculture and land sectors;
- Another FCSP grantee established 106 older people's councils in 11 regions at the ward level. One activity that these councils undertook was holding a number of engagement meetings aimed at demanding accountability from local councillors to release funds committed in their budget for supporting older people's needs. It is reported that as a result, Muleba district set aside TZS 10 million for older people's income generation activities and a community health fund. Similarly, Karagwe district council released TZS 8.9 million in 2014 for community health fund cards and the construction of two houses for older people in need.


Overall, the narrative analysis confirms the role of media oversight (M3) suggested by QCA, but provides illustrative evidence that in some weak social contract contexts, formal citizen engagement (IO2) can be more important than informal citizen engagement (IO4). Figure 4.2 illustrates this schematically and references the relevant case studies.

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<sup>91</sup> Coffey (2015), op. cit., p.16.

<sup>92</sup> DFID (2014), op. cit.


Figure 4.2: Hypothesis 5 and case studies



## 4.2 Hypothesis 6: Demand-side support to citizenship and monitoring capacity for effective citizen engagement

### 4.2.1 Summary findings for hypotheses 6a and 6b

Focus Area 3: Social accountability and the social contract – Hypothesis 6	
<b>Hypotheses</b>	<p><b>Hypothesis 6a:</b> In a state-society context with a strong social contract (C4), improving citizens’ knowledge of their entitlements (M4) and/or improving their capacity to monitor services (M2) will increase formal citizen engagement with service providers (IO2).</p> <div style="display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center; gap: 10px;"> <div style="border: 1px solid gray; border-radius: 10px; padding: 5px; background-color: #d9e1f2;">Context: Strong social contract</div> <div style="font-size: 24px;">+</div> <div style="border: 1px solid gray; border-radius: 10px; padding: 5px; background-color: #d9e1f2;">Improving citizens’ knowledge of their entitlements</div> <div style="font-size: 24px;">+</div> <div style="border: 1px solid gray; border-radius: 10px; padding: 5px; background-color: #d9e1f2;">Improving citizens’ capacity to monitor services</div> <div style="font-size: 24px;">→</div> <div style="border: 1px solid gray; border-radius: 10px; padding: 5px; background-color: #3b5998; color: white;">Increased formal citizen engagement</div> </div> <p><b>Hypothesis 6b:</b> In a state-society context with a weak social contract (c4), improving citizens’ knowledge of their entitlements (M4) and/or improving their capacity to monitor services (M2) will increase formal citizen engagement with service providers (IO2).</p> <div style="display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center; gap: 10px;"> <div style="border: 1px solid gray; border-radius: 10px; padding: 5px; background-color: #d9e1f2;">Context: Weak social contract</div> <div style="font-size: 24px;">+</div> <div style="border: 1px solid gray; border-radius: 10px; padding: 5px; background-color: #d9e1f2;">Improving citizens’ knowledge of their entitlements</div> <div style="font-size: 24px;">+</div> <div style="border: 1px solid gray; border-radius: 10px; padding: 5px; background-color: #d9e1f2;">Improving citizens’ capacity to monitor services</div> <div style="font-size: 24px;">→</div> <div style="border: 1px solid gray; border-radius: 10px; padding: 5px; background-color: #3b5998; color: white;">Increased formal citizen engagement</div> </div>
<b>QCA finding</b>	<p>Hypothesis 6a is ambivalent and hypothesis 6b is rejected. The wording of both hypotheses suggests a sufficiency relationship which was tested using QCA.</p> <p>In the ambivalent analysis of hypothesis 6a, the model only includes eight cases, all of which achieved the outcome. In the case of hypothesis 6b, improving citizens’ knowledge of their entitlements is not sufficient but necessary. No other condition in the model is sufficient or necessary. The analysis of hypothesis 6b also suffers from a lack of unsuccessful cases (but was still significant), underlining the need to treat the QCA findings for these hypotheses with much caution.</p> <p><b>In the context of a weak social contract (C4), improving citizens’ knowledge of their entitlements (M4) is necessary to achieve increased formal citizen engagement with service providers (IO2). We also found a strong social contract by itself to be sufficient</b></p>



### 4.2.2 Testing the hypothesis

This section explains in detail how the hypothesis was tested through the application of QCA. Given that the hypothesis suggests a sufficiency relationship, its validity is tested through parameters of fit in relation to sufficiency. We establish whether the evidence confirms or rejects the hypothesis, based on the criteria identified in the methodology section of this report.

**Hypothesis 6a: In a state-society context with a strong social contract (C4), improving citizens' knowledge of their entitlements (M4) and/or improving their capacity to monitor services (M2) will increase formal citizen engagement with service providers (IO2)**

#### Hypothesis ambivalent

In QCA terms, the hypothesis posits that in the context of a strong social contract (C4), improving citizens' knowledge of their entitlements (M4), improving their capacity to monitor services (M2) or the combination of both is sufficient for increased formal citizen engagement with service providers (IO2).

The combination is sufficient but not necessary with a sufficiency consistency of 100% (6 out of 6 cases)<sup>93</sup> and sufficiency coverage of 75% (6 out of 8 cases). Improving citizens' capacity to monitor services (M2) as a single condition is also sufficient but not necessary, equally with a sufficiency consistency of 100% (6 out of 6 cases)<sup>94</sup> and sufficiency coverage of 75% (6 out of 8 cases). Improving citizens' knowledge of their entitlements (M4) as a single condition is both sufficient and necessary. Sufficiency consistency and coverage as well as necessity consistency and coverage are all at 100% (8 out of 8 cases).<sup>95</sup> While all conditions in the model are sufficient for the outcome, M4 is therefore the most important factor.

However, the model includes only eight cases of which all achieve the outcome. The QCA findings for sufficiency are therefore not significant in line with the criteria established in the methodology section of this report. The necessity relation for M4 is also ambivalent because there is no case that does not present the condition (M4). The hypothesis has to be characterised as ambivalent.

Table 4.3 shows the distribution of cases for each tested configuration.

**Table 4.3: QCA analysis of competing models for hypothesis 6a**

<b>Mechanisms</b>	<b>Outcome: Increased formal citizen engagement (IO2)</b>		
Number of cases in this model: 8	<b>Present</b>	<b>Absent</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>M2 and M4 both present</b>	6	0	6
<b>M2 present (M4 absent)</b>	0	0	0
<b>M4 present (M2 absent)</b>	2	0	2
<b>M2 and M4 both absent</b>	0	0	0
<b>Mechanisms</b>	<b>Outcome: Increased formal citizen engagement (IO2)</b>		
Number of cases in this model: 8	<b>Present</b>	<b>Absent</b>	<b>Total</b>

<sup>93</sup> Significance: 97%.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> Significance: 99+%.



<b>M2 present (as a single condition)</b>	6	0	6
<b>M2 absent (as a single condition)</b>	2	0	2
<b>Mechanisms</b>	<b>Outcome: Increased formal citizen engagement (IO2)</b>		
Number of cases in this model: 8	<b>Present</b>	<b>Absent</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>M4 present (as a single condition)</b>	8	0	8
<b>M4 absent (as a single condition)</b>	0	0	0

**Hypothesis 6b: In a state-society context with a weak social contract (c4), improving citizens' knowledge of their entitlements (M4) and/or improving their capacity to monitor services (M2) will increase formal citizen engagement with service providers (IO2)**

Hypothesis rejected

In QCA terms, the hypothesis posits that in the context of a weak social contract (c4), improving citizens' knowledge of their entitlements (M4), improving their capacity to monitor services (M2) or the combination of both is sufficient for increased formal citizen engagement with service providers (IO2).

The combination is neither sufficient nor necessary and has a sufficiency consistency of 88% (15 out of 17 cases) and sufficiency coverage of 83% (15 out of 18 cases). Improving citizens' capacity to monitor services (M2) as a single condition is also not sufficient nor necessary, and has a sufficiency consistency of 89% (16 out of 18 cases) and sufficiency coverage of 89% (16 out of 18 cases). Improving citizens' knowledge of their entitlements (M4) as a single condition is not sufficient but necessary. Sufficiency consistency is 89% (17 out of 19 cases) and sufficiency coverage is 94% (17 out of 18 cases). Correspondingly, necessity consistency is 94% (17 out of 18 cases) and necessity coverage is 89% (17 out of 19 cases).

None of the conditions in the model nor their combination is sufficient for the outcome, although they are all very close to the sufficiency threshold of 90%. The hypothesis is therefore rejected. However, it is important to note that there are only two cases in the model where the outcome was not achieved. While this is just at the threshold for significance as established in the methodology section of this report, the finding should be treated with much caution.

Table 4.4 shows the distribution of cases for each tested configuration.

**Table 4.4: QCA analysis of competing models for hypothesis 6b**


<b>Mechanisms</b>	<b>Outcome: Increased formal citizen engagement (IO2)</b>		
Number of cases in this model: 20	<b>Present</b>	<b>Absent</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>M2 and M4 both present</b>	15	2	17
<b>M2 present (M4 absent)</b>	1	0	2
<b>M4 present (M2 absent)</b>	2	0	2
<b>M2 and M4 both absent</b>	0	0	0
<b>Mechanisms</b>	<b>Outcome: Increased formal citizen engagement (IO2)</b>		
Number of cases in this model: 20	<b>Present</b>	<b>Absent</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>M2 present (as a single condition)</b>	16	2	18
<b>M2 absent (as a single condition)</b>	2	0	2
<b>Mechanisms</b>	<b>Outcome: Increased formal citizen engagement (IO2)</b>		
Number of cases in this model: 20	<b>Present</b>	<b>Absent</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>M4 present (as a single condition)</b>	17	2	19
<b>M4 absent (as a single condition)</b>	1	0	20

**In the context of a weak social contract, improving citizens' knowledge of their entitlements (M4) is necessary for achieving increased formal citizen engagement with service providers (IO2). We also found a strong social contract by itself to be sufficient for the outcome to occur.**

Hypothesis 6a was ambivalent. In the analysis of hypothesis 6b, improving citizens' knowledge of their entitlements was not sufficient but necessary. No other condition in the model was sufficient nor necessary. However, the analysis was suffering from a lack of unsuccessful cases (but still significant) and this finding has to be treated with much caution.

Following the QCA finding, our revised theory looks as follows:

**Figure 4.3: QCA revised theory for hypotheses 6a and 6b**



### 4.2.3 Illustrating the hypothesised causal mechanisms

Given that QCA led to a revised hypothesis, the focus of the narrative analysis is to illustrate and explain the hypothesised causal mechanism. The following section illustrates how the hypothesised causal mechanism manifests itself in practice in the two consistent case studies. The following consistent case studies were selected:<sup>96</sup>

Hypothesis 6a:

- Consistent case (modal): Madhya Pradesh Rural Livelihoods Project – Phase II (#113617)
- Consistent case (outlier): Strengthening Monitoring and Performance Management for the Poor in South Africa, 2012–15 (#202542)

Hypothesis 6b:

- Consistent case (modal): Foundation for Civil Society Programme, Tanzania, 2008–15 (#113540)
- Consistent case (outlier): Support to Healthcare Workers Salaries in Sierra Leone, 2010–16 (#201853)

The starting point for the narrative analysis is the QCA finding that in contexts of a weak social contract, improving citizens’ knowledge of their entitlements (M4) is most important for achieving increased formal citizen engagement with service providers (IO2).. A strong social contract is also sufficient for the outcome to occur.

Tables 4.5 and 4.6 summarise the four consistent case studies and to what extent the sampled projects have achieved increased formal citizen engagement (IO2):

**Table 4.5: Consistent case summaries for hypothesis 6a (strong social contract)**

Consistent case (modal): Madhya Pradesh Rural Livelihoods Project – Phase II (#113617)	Consistent case (outlier): Strengthening Monitoring and Performance Management for the Poor in South Africa, 2012–15 (#202542)
The Madhya Pradesh Rural Livelihoods Project (MPRLP) phase II was implemented in a strong	The Strengthening Monitoring and Performance Management for the Poor in South Africa

<sup>96</sup> See methodology section for details on the selection procedure.

<p>social contract context, characterised by strong pro-poor policies and space for citizen engagement. Through working with the <i>gram sabhas</i>, the programme aimed to enable the village community to identify the poor and poorest and to provide them with a mix of grants/ loans to access their entitlements under government schemes.</p> <p><b>MPRLP achieved increased formal citizen engagement (IO2).</b> The project embedded local accountability elements for service delivery within the gram sabhas, using a participatory 'micro-planning' approach to identify the needs of the poorest and ensure that the gram sabhas were serving these needs through their prioritisation and allocation of discretionary elements of <i>gram kosh</i> budgets. The project also worked with other village institutions – such as village development committees and self-help groups representing the poor and marginalised – to embed their effective participation in local governance. Citizen engagement in gram sabhas and other village institutions improved significantly through the project.</p>	<p>(SMPMP) project utilised the social contract entry point of the government's 'open government partnership' commitment. Working with this policy commitment, the project supported civic engagement for greater accountability, at both central and provincial levels.</p> <p><b>SMPMP achieved increased formal citizen engagement (IO2).</b> The project was evaluated to have empowered citizens in their relationship with the state. Examples include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Citizen monitoring with a total of 1,452 citizens involved in the process of monitoring 650 facilities.</li> <li>• The citizen-based monitoring also included setting up a presidential hotline. It was reported that 53,533 complaints had been logged on this hotline since April 2013, and the case resolution rate most recently assessed was 95%.<sup>97</sup></li> </ul>
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**Table 4.6: Consistent case summaries for hypothesis 6b (weak social contract)**

<p><b>Consistent case (modal): Foundation for Civil Society Programme, Tanzania, 2008–15 (#113540)</b></p>	<p><b>Consistent case (outlier): Support to Healthcare Workers Salaries in Sierra Leone, 2010–16 (#201853)</b></p>
<p>The Tanzania FCSP operated in a weak social contract context. The political liberalisation of the early 1990s had failed to translate into meaningful citizen participation during the programme lifetime. The programme awarded multiple small grant sub-projects on a competitive basis to NGOs/CSOs working on demand-side citizen awareness raising and CSO capacity building.</p> <p><b>FCSP achieved increased formal citizen engagement (IO2).</b> FCSP successfully funded citizen engagement in local SAcc processes, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• One grantee organisation, Tushiriki, established five forest management committees.</li> <li>• In Newala, a workshop was conducted by the Newala Farmers Empowerment Project. Land tribunals at the village, ward and district levels began involving the community in the implementation of</li> </ul>	<p>The Support to Healthcare Workers Salaries in Sierra Leone programme operated in a weak social contract context, following years of civil war in the country. The programme strengthened formal citizen monitoring of local health facilities as part of broader governance support to the implementation of the Government of Sierra Leone's FHCI policy.</p> <p><b>Support to Healthcare Workers Salaries in Sierra Leone achieved increased formal citizen engagement (IO2).</b> Under the programme, the HFAC was set up as a national network of volunteer citizen monitors, a demand-side mechanism that was complementary (although largely parallel) to the programme's support for improved internal health management information system data flows. For the HFAC data collection, a network of monitors was recruited – one at each health facility. These monitors collected information both from patients and the health facility itself, and provided regular monitoring information both upwards and downwards. They</p>

<sup>97</sup> DFID (2015), Strengthening Performance Monitoring and Evaluation for the Poor in South Africa, Annual Review, London: DFID, p.17.

<p>development plans in the agriculture and land sectors.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Another FCSP grantee established 106 older people’s councils in 11 regions at the ward level. One activity that these councils undertook was holding a number of engagement meetings aimed at demanding accountability from local councillors to release funds committed in their budget for supporting older people’s needs.<sup>98</sup></li> </ul>	<p>also institutionalised formal citizen engagement in service delivery.</p>
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**Improving citizens’ knowledge of their entitlements (M4) was found to contribute to formal citizen engagement with service providers (IO2) but evidence remains weak**

All consistent cases illustrate that improving citizens’ knowledge of their entitlements (M4) can contribute to formal citizen engagement with service providers (IO2). However, the evidence base is weak and does not allow for an in-depth assessment of the connecting mechanisms.

**MPRLP** worked to improve citizens’ knowledge of their entitlements (M4). The DFID Annual Review 2012 stated that MPRLP had enhanced people’s awareness with regards to a whole range of issues, including access to information, financial services and health.

**SMPMP** improved citizens’ knowledge of their entitlements (M4) through implementing community radio. The DFID Annual Review 2015 stated that, ‘*Community radio has been found to be an important communication and accountability tool in the process informing citizens of the work being done and following up on the findings and commitments made.*’<sup>99</sup> A DFID key informant indicated that community radio was used as part of the citizen-based monitoring process, to alert citizens, and to disseminate and discuss findings of the surveys.

Arguably, as well as improving citizens’ capacity to monitor services, **FCSP** also simultaneously improved citizens’ knowledge of their entitlements (M4). This is because as citizens learned the methodology, they were able to see where the government was allocating budget and where it was not. However, there were also factors outside of the project which might have been contributing to the presence of this condition. The 2014 Annual Review reported that Tanzanian citizens were now better informed, reflecting a young and increasingly urban population with better access to both media and school than in the past: ‘*There are indications that these enabling factors are increasingly breaking down a culture of silence and fear that has characterized many ordinary Tanzanians for quite some time[s].*’<sup>100</sup>

Finally, **Support to Healthcare Workers Salaries in Sierra Leone** also improved citizens’ knowledge of their entitlements, primarily through downwards reporting by the volunteer monitors. Facility-level volunteers did not only feed evidence upwards but also informed

<sup>98</sup> DFID (2014), ‘FCSP Annual Review’. London: DFID.

<sup>99</sup> DFID (2015) Strengthening Performance Monitoring and Evaluation for the Poor in South Africa, Annual Review. London: DFID, p.3.

<sup>100</sup> DFID (2015), FCSP Project Completion Report. London: DFID.

## **A strong social contract (C4) was found to enable increased formal citizen engagement (IO2)**

Overall, both cases provide illustrative evidence of how a context of a strong social contract (C4) in itself enables formal citizen engagement (IO2). The projects strengthened this process.

In the case of the 'consistent case' **MPRLP**, in a state with high levels of poverty, government pro-poor policies and budgets were evident. Added to this pro-poor policy context, government institutions were set up to enable citizen engagement and reflected a strong social contract. The focus of this social contract for the MPRLP was the institution of local self-governance. This represented a political space for the project to strengthen state-citizen accountability relations. The *gram panchayat* is the institutional arrangement for decentralised governance in India. It includes elected local citizens.<sup>101</sup> A *gram sabha* is comprised of every adult member of a village. The members of the *gram sabha* elect members for the *gram panchayat*. Through working with the *gram sabhas*, the programme aimed to enable the village community to identify the poor and poorest and to provide them with a mix of grants/loans to access their entitlements under government schemes. There were local accountability elements for service delivery already in place within the *gram sabhas* but the project aimed to strengthen them. It was the strong social contract context that already enabled local self-governance and formal citizen engagement.

The 'consistent case' **SMPMP** project also operated in a context with a strong social contract. The social contract entry point for this project was the government's 'open government partnership' commitment. This was part of a multilateral initiative that aimed to secure concrete commitments from governments to promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption and harness new technologies to strengthen governance.<sup>102</sup> The SMPMP project aimed to support the government to effectively deliver on its country action plan for the open government partnership, specifically on civic engagement for greater accountability, both at central and provincial levels. While the project enhanced implementation, it was the social contract context that enabled formal citizen engagement in the first place.

### **4.2.4 Looking for explanations**

This section looks beyond the hypothesised relationships to explore other explanations for the achievement of increased formal citizen engagement (IO2). In particular, the interrogation of the inconsistent case is sought to help achieve a deeper understanding of the causal mechanisms at play. The following inconsistent case was selected:<sup>103</sup>

- Inconsistent case: Twaweza, Tanzania (2009–18) (#200304)

The inconsistent cases Twaweza displayed the hypothesised causal mechanism but did not achieve the outcome. Table 4.7 summarises the inconsistent case study and to what extent the sampled project achieved increased formal citizen engagement (IO2).

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<sup>101</sup> Gram sabhas are defined by the Madhya Pradesh Panchayati Raj and Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam (Act) 1993, as the fourth tier of the Panchayati Raj Institutional set-up and as a unit for decentralised governance. See (<http://www.importantindia.com/12463/gram-sabha-and-gram-panchayat-in-india/>).

<sup>102</sup> <http://www.opengovpartnership.org/about>, accessed 10 February 2016.

<sup>103</sup> See methodology section for details on the selection procedure.

**Table 4.7: Inconsistent case summary**

Inconsistent case: Twaweza, Tanzania (2009–18) (#200304)
<p>Twaweza ('we can make it happen' in Swahili) is an ongoing 10-year initiative. It disburses and manages grants to a small number of relatively large NGOs or civil society partners to implement demand-side activities. Twaweza's core purpose is to enable citizens in East Africa to exercise their agency and access basic services through better information, strengthened media independence and citizen monitoring.</p> <p>Twaweza provides several examples of improving citizens' knowledge of their entitlements (M4). The project produced valuable and good quality citizen-generated information on basic services. It also achieved remarkable success in the large-scale diffusion of this information – reaching 25–20% citizens – and accompanying promotion of a culture of evidence-based analysis in the media and even within government. Furthermore, the project supported successful initiatives focused on citizen monitoring; for example, by collaborating with HakiElimu and the Policy Forum on an initiative to enable citizens to monitor the disbursement school capitation grants to secondary schools nationwide. These examples illustrate that Twaweza was effective in raising awareness and improving citizens' knowledge of their entitlements.</p> <p><b>However, the project did not achieve increased formal citizen engagement (IO2).</b> It appeared that while Twaweza had been very successful in getting information out into the public domain and reaching a large percentage of the population with its messages, it failed by that stage to catalyse citizen action. There was little evidence by the mid-point of this 10-year project that formal citizen engagement with service providers had increased.</p>

**In weak social contract contexts, project support to SAcc processes was undermined by failure to support institutions that connected state and citizens**

The illustrative narrative analysis evidence suggests that increased formal citizen engagement is best achieved through a proactive support to institutions that connect citizens and the state. This was the main difference between the case that achieved the outcome and the case that did not.

When comparing evaluative reporting of the two programmes operating in Tanzania in the absence of a strong social contract, a key difference emerges between the consistent case **FCSP** and the inconsistent case **Twaweza**. Twaweza openly stated that it was never its aim to catalyse citizen action. Its ethos was not meant to be top-down or prescriptive; rather, the idea was to get information out into the public domain and then let citizens mobilise and act on this information themselves. Indeed, there was recognition at Twaweza, reflected in its second-phase strategy document,<sup>104</sup> that this approach had not really worked. As Twaweza management key informants stated:

*Twaweza needs to move away from an unexplained 'magic sauce' model where we feed some inputs [i.e. information] into a complex system, hope that the [self-selecting, undifferentiated] citizens will stir it themselves, and voila – a big outcome [such as*

<sup>104</sup> Twaweza (nd). *Twaweza East Africa Strategy, 2015–18*, Available at <http://www.twaweza.org/uploads/files/TwawezaStrategy2015-2018.pdf>

*increased citizen monitoring of services, and improved service delivery] will somehow pop out on the other end.*<sup>105</sup>

This analysis stands in contrast to **FCSP**. As discussed above, the programme supported citizen evidence gathering, monitoring and feedback, and improved citizens' knowledge of their entitlements through the implementation of public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS) and social accounting mechanisms (SAM). The FCSP's support to grantees resulted in the formation of 30 PETS/SAM committees in five regions of Tanzania. The PCR reported that more than 1.3 million citizens were trained in PETS and SAM methodologies. Rolling out PETS and SAMs served the dual purpose of informing citizens about government budgeting and spending while increasing their engagement with government budget holders.

**Social accountability initiatives in both strong and weak social contract contexts were more likely to sustain formal citizen engagement when they took a long-term approach and worked through existing local organisations and networks**

Overall, the illustrative case study evidence indicates that sustaining citizen engagement often depends on taking a long-term approach and working through existing local organisations and networks.

The two cases in strong social contract contexts (**MPRLP II** and **SMPMP**) worked through existing institutions and structures. In the case of MPRLP II, these were the institutions of local self-governance *gram sabha*, and in SMPMP the governments country action plan and its existing governance structure. This also meant that both projects were taking a long-term approach, working through institutions and structures that existed for a long time.

Similarly, **FCSP** had been in operation for over a decade (2002-ongoing, but with the DFID project finishing in 2015). Interviews conducted by the 2015 review team found that the critical factor in FCSP's success was its legitimacy as a locally constituted and governed organisation. The evaluation concluded:

*None of the key conditions essential for success would be met without this aura of legitimacy, which ensures access to MDAs [ministries, departments and agencies], the moral authority to critique government policies on behalf of Tanzanians for the benefit of Tanzania, and stature to cultivate democratic values by nurturing civil society ecosystem.*<sup>106</sup>

While **Support to Healthcare Workers Salaries in Sierra Leone** achieved the outcome of increased formal citizen engagement, sustainability risks were evident in the approach undertaken. The project established a network of volunteer citizens to monitor facility-level service delivery, which was new and not part of existing institutions and structures. The network also operated largely in parallel to supply-side reforms. The network reported primarily

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<sup>105</sup> Varja Lipovsek and Rakesh Rajani in response to a series of blog posts by Duncan Green on Twaweza's big rethink, cited in Rath et al., 2015, p.87).

<http://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/last-word-to-Twaweza-varja-lipovsek-and-rakesh-rajani-on-how-to-keep-the-ambition-and-complexity-be-less-fuzzy-and-get-more-traction/>

<sup>106</sup> DFID (2015), *Twaweza Project Completion Report*. London: DFID, p.20.



upwards and an opportunity was lost to embed this into institutionalised facility-level problem-solving discussions and thus build and sustain citizen engagement.

The **Twaweza** programme in Tanzania is now in its 8th year of operation, with DFID funding having finished in 2015. The vision was always long term and the design document stated that in the scoping phase, a typical comment from stakeholders was, ‘*unless you can think in at least 7–10 year terms or more, don’t even bother*’ (unnamed informant, pp.15–16). However, Twaweza depended very much on the personal connections and networks of its director rather than existing local institutions and networks. As one unnamed respondent in the programme evaluation stated, ‘*Twaweza seems to be very much an organisation cast in (the director’s) image*’.<sup>107</sup>

### **Strengthening the capacities of civil society through a strong on-the-ground presence appeared to be key to increasing formal citizen engagement**

Comparing the cases of **Twaweza** and **FCSP** in Tanzania is instructive here. Twaweza was able to reach a large section of the population with its messages but it did so via national media channels such as newspapers and television. By comparison, FCSP reached its audience through an on-the-ground presence in many communities via the various CSOs with which it worked. Project grant making came with a deliberate focus on capacity development, tailored to the individual needs of the grantee organisation. FCSP also encouraged the new formation of community groups with developmental objectives while strengthening more established CSOs and empowered them to engage with governance structures. It is notable that the programme also facilitated linkages between CSOs, encouraging communication and networking between them. This approach is discussed and evaluated positively in the Project Completion Report:

*Actively facilitating the creation of CSO coalitions may seem to be a logical, attractive strategy to amplify demand. However, creating a space for CSOs to meet, find common causes and for coalitions to emerge organically, may be an equally effective and sustainable strategy for mobilising public demand for improved service delivery, alongside supporting spontaneous movements that emerge in the public space [and on social networking sites].*<sup>108</sup>

Hence local channels were more successful than national ones at building horizontal networks of communities that were more likely to collaborate, challenge or engage with each other and service providers. This is because under FCSP – as well as in the **India MPRLP II** – the staff of the local organisations within communities were able to offer information to citizens, but also engage in a deeper dialogue about how to use the information to affect a change in citizen engagement with service providers. The MPRLP Project Completion Report concluded:

*In hindsight, we found that the success of MPRLP lay in the close interaction between staff [especially field workers] and the beneficiaries, and the consequent high degree of trust that had developed between them. Part of this trust stemmed from MPRLP*

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<sup>107</sup> Rath, V. et al. (2015), ‘Evaluation: Twaweza Tanzania, 2009–14’, *Policy Research International*, February, p.134.

<sup>108</sup> DFID (2015), *FCSP Project Completion Report*. London: DFID, p.41.

*staff informing beneficiaries, and helping them access their rights and entitlements available under various state and centrally sponsored schemes.*<sup>109</sup>


Similarly, the ongoing **Support to Healthcare Workers Salaries in Sierra Leone** programme had a strong on-the-ground presence through the volunteer monitors that were placed in health facilities. Finally, a **SMPMP** review noted the importance of facilitator CSOs in supporting local citizen engagement through the programme’s citizen-based monitoring component:

*The role that (CSOs play) in the citizen-based monitoring work in gathering data through staff and citizen survey at select facilities, supporting analysis and coordination are key to ensure effective citizen engagement solving.*<sup>110</sup>

**Overall, the narrative analysis confirms the role of improving citizens’ knowledge of their entitlements (M4) and a strong social contract (C4) context to achieve increased formal citizen engagement (IO2). Illustrative evidence adds the contributory factors of taking a long-term approach, working through existing local organisations and networks and a strong on-the-ground presence. In contexts of a weak social contract, supporting institutions that connect state and citizens plays an important role too.**

Figure 4.4 illustrates this schematically and references the relevant case studies.

**Figure 4.4: Hypotheses 6a and 6b and case studies**



<sup>109</sup> DFID (2013), *MPRLP II Project Completion Report*. London: DFID, p. 27.

<sup>110</sup> DFID (2015), *SMPMP Annual Review*. London: DFID, p.17.

## 5 Conclusions

In Sections 2–4 we presented project set analysis findings of seven hypotheses, clustered into three focus areas. These hypotheses tested causal pathways of contexts, mechanisms, intermediate outcomes and outcomes (as explained in Section 1 and in Annex B).

We are able to synthesise our project set analysis findings into a number of operationally relevant conclusions regarding DFID’s experience with SAcc interventions. We map our findings from the three focus areas on to these conclusions and through to recommendations (see Section 6) in Tables 5.1 – 5.3. We discuss these conclusions further below.

## 5.1 Conclusion 1: Achieving improvements at scale

**Table 5.1: Focus Area 1: Findings, conclusions and recommendations**

Findings	
Focus area	In most cases, improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery is not achieved. QCA found that feeding evidence and learning into processes of higher-level legislative and policy change is neither necessary nor sufficient. Illustrative evidence from the narrative analysis suggests that the outcome can be achieved if SAcc processes are also embedded in policy or programme frameworks.
Focus area 1,	Improved local-level (project area) service delivery is almost always achieved. There is insufficient variation to assess the effectiveness of supporting formal (invited) and informal (uninvited) citizen engagement through QCA. Illustrative evidence from the narrative analysis suggests that formal (invited) citizen engagement is essential, with informal (uninvited) citizen engagement and support to skilled facilitators with close community links playing a reinforcing role. Supply-side resource and capacity constraints appear to be the main risks.
Focus area	QCA found that supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement is necessary to achieve improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery. Illustrative evidence from the narrative analysis suggests that supporting informal (uninvited) citizen engagement, civil society networking and institutionalisation of citizen engagement can contribute.
Conclusions	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SAcc is much more effective in achieving improved local-level (project area) service delivery than improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery</li> <li>• Supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement is necessary to achieve improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery.</li> <li>• Illustrative evidence suggests that this is also the case for achieving improved local-level (project) area service delivery. To achieve improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery, there is illustrative evidence that supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement needs to be part of a highly institutionalised and integrated approach. On the supply side, SAcc needs to be institutionalised and embedded in policy or programme frameworks, including channels for evidence to flow upwards. On the demand side, civil society needs to be well coordinated and vertically integrated.</li> </ul>
Recommendations	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focus on supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement as a key building block to effective SAcc</li> <li>• Apply a strategic approach to SAcc</li> <li>• Based on illustrative case study evidence only, consider embedding and institutionalising SAcc in policies and programmes that expand entitlements, and consider ensuring vertical integration through civil society networking and channels for evidence to flow upwards</li> </ul>

Our analysis suggests that social accountability is much more able to achieve improved local-level (project area) service delivery than improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery. At the local level, DFID support to local SAcc processes is widely effective in improving services. Behaviours change, procedures improve and resources are more equitably allocated. Illustrative evidence suggests that a key driver of success at the local level is support to formal (invited) citizen engagement such as through village meetings and facility committees, often supported by skilled facilitators with close community links. In some cases, informal (uninvited) citizen action, such as social campaigns or demonstrations, plays a supporting role. Supply-side resource and capacity constraints sometimes limit or undermine the scope and sustainability of such local-level SAcc processes.

However, support to SAcc is much less effective in achieving improved higher-level (at-scale) service delivery. Where contribution is demonstrated, SAcc is based on supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement. Illustrative evidence indicates that this support needs to be part of a highly institutionalised and integrated approach. This suggests that a strategic approach is needed for SAcc to contribute to improved services, as recommended by Fox (2014). Our analysis confirms the Fox’s observations on the presence of ‘accountability traps’ and provides illustrative evidence for the need to move beyond tactical approaches to achieve success at scale.

Strategic approaches illustrated by our case study narrative analysis included supply-and demand-side activities. On the supply side, SAcc needed to be embedded in policies and programmes that leverage entitlements to, and expand resources for, public services. On the demand side, civil society had to be well coordinated and vertically integrated. Illustrative evidence from the narrative analysis found that vertically integrating local organisations could provide the necessary weight to influence decision making. In our case studies, vertical integration was achieved through hierarchies of locally supported organisations or through partnerships between CBOs and higher-level CSOs. Narrative analysis illustrative evidence also confirmed that channelling evidence upwards, flexibly and with political sensitivity, could effectively support higher-level policy and programme discussions. We found three types of evidence being fed into policy discussions: (i) longitudinal impact monitoring to ground-truth policy discussions; (ii) shorter-term outcome monitoring; and (iii) lesson learning on SAcc processes for mainstreaming at scale.

## 5.2 Conclusion 2: Leaving no one behind

**Table 5.2: Focus Area 2: Findings, conclusions and recommendations**

Findings		Conclusions	Recommendations
Focus area 2:	QCA found that supporting socially inclusive platforms results in improved services for marginalised groups, with awareness raising playing a supporting role. Illustrative evidence from the narrative analysis suggests that a conducive policy environment and targeted supply-side measures can be significant contributory factors in achieving improved services for marginalised groups.		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SAcc can achieve improved services for marginalised groups if socially inclusive platforms are supported. Awareness raising can play a supporting role</li> <li>• Illustrative evidence suggests that in some cases, SAcc is not sufficient and needs to be complemented by supply-side measures specifically targeting marginalised groups</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To leave no one behind, ensure that SAcc platforms are socially inclusive</li> <li>• Based on illustrative case study evidence only, consider that supply-side measures complement the programme's targeting of marginalised groups</li> </ul>
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At the local level, the macro evaluation found that SAcc processes were often not designed specifically to reach the most marginalised. Illustrative evidence from the narrative analysis found that targeting these marginalised groups was done in one of three ways: (i) hooking SAcc into supply-side support for services that targeted a vulnerable group – most obviously in maternal and child health programmes; (ii) finding ways of including marginalised groups in local dialogue – most commonly through women's participation; and (iii) by ensuring that discretionary budgets were, as far as possible, taking into account the needs of the most marginalised. In the best case, macro-level policy support expanded entitlement sets for specifically targeted marginal groups at scale.

Our analysis finds that SAcc can contribute to improved services for marginalised groups. The most important mechanism for this is to support socially inclusive platforms such as facility committees with gender or other social inclusion criteria. Awareness raising plays a supporting role and reinforces the drive for social inclusion that such platforms can promote.

Illustrative evidence suggests that in many cases, an enabling policy environment provides the breeding ground for such socially inclusive platforms to be established and functioning. The narrative analysis also indicates that in some cases, SAcc is not sufficient and needs to be complemented by supply-side measures specifically targeting marginalised groups. This appears to be particularly the case in broader service delivery initiatives where social inclusion can be built into service delivery reforms on the supply side. Overall, we conclude that SAcc is able to deliver against the ambition to leave no one behind if project design specifically prioritises measures to promote social inclusion.

### 5.3 Conclusion 3: Operating in contexts of a weak social contract

Table 5.3: Focus Area 3: Findings, conclusions and recommendations

Findings	
Focus area 3,	QCA found that when state-society relations indicate a weak social contract (C4), greater local-level responsiveness (IO1) is best achieved via informal citizen engagement (IO4) and media oversight (M3). Illustrative evidence from the narrative analysis suggests that in some cases, formal citizen engagement (IO2) can be more important than informal citizen engagement (IO4).
Focus area 3,	QCA found that in the context of a weak social contract (C4), improving citizens' knowledge of their entitlements (M4) is necessary to achieve increased formal citizen engagement with service providers (IO2). We also found a strong social contract by itself to be sufficient for the outcome to occur. Illustrative evidence from the narrative analysis adds the contributory factors of working long term through existing organisations and networks, and through a strong on-the-ground presence. In contexts of a weak social contract, supporting institutions that connect state and citizens plays an important role too.
Conclusions	Recommendations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>When there is a weak social contract, greater local-level responsiveness is best achieved via informal citizen action, with media oversight playing a supporting role.</li> <li>Formal citizen engagement is best increased through improving citizens' knowledge of their entitlements. A strong social contract is by itself a strong driver of formal citizen engagement.</li> <li>Illustrative evidence suggests that formal citizen engagement can be more important than informal citizen action in achieving greater local-level responsiveness. The narrative analysis also indicates that formal citizen engagement can be increased through working long term through existing organisations and networks, and through a strong on-the-ground presence,</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consider the context very carefully when designing and implementing a SAcc initiative</li> <li>When operating in the context of a weak social contract, focus on building informal citizen engagement and supporting media oversight</li> <li>To increase formal citizen engagement in such contexts, build citizens' knowledge of their entitlements</li> <li>Based on illustrative case study evidence only, consider working long term through existing organisations and networks, and through a strong on-the-ground presence to build formal citizen engagement</li> </ul>

We conclude that SAcc is more effective in contexts of a strong social contract than in contexts of a weak social contract. For instance, our analysis suggests that a strong social contract is by itself already a strong driver of formal citizen engagement.

When the social contract is weak, informal citizen engagement appears to be more important than formal citizen engagement to achieve greater local-level responsiveness. However, illustrative evidence from the narrative analysis suggests that this is not always the case. We found that in such controlled environments, space for informal citizen action such as social campaigns or demonstrations can be limited. Either way, supporting media oversight plays a supporting role and reinforces the messages delivered through different channels of citizen participation.

We found that formal citizen engagement is best increased through increasing citizens' knowledge of their entitlements. Our illustrative case study analysis identified a number of significant supporting elements to increase and sustain formal citizen engagement. These included working long term through existing organisations and networks, and through a strong on-the-ground presence

Overall, in contexts of a weak social contract, effective SAcc depends on careful project design and implementation. Sustained improvements in service delivery are not as easily achieved as in contexts of a strong social contract. Context sensitivity is key in programme design and implementation.



## 6 Recommendations

This final section of the report flags operational signposts that DFID might consider as part of a 'way forward' on social accountability. The suggestions below are by no means definitive and certainly not specific. Instead they are part of an ongoing, iterative process of discussion through the evaluation and beyond. We identify three signposts for social accountability programming.

### 6.1 Recommendation 1: Apply a strategic approach to social accountability

Our analysis confirms the presence of accountability traps as suggested by Fox (2014) and provide illustrative evidence for the need to move beyond tactical approaches to achieve success at scale. Localised SAcc initiatives tend to be effective but their achievements are usually limited and often unsustainable. Our analysis has shown that a minority of SAcc projects have effectively integrated macro policy and grassroots support to social accountability for at-scale outcome, but in a portfolio where the majority of SAcc projects have failed to contribute to at-scale improvements in service delivery.

A strategic approach to SAcc is needed for broader impacts, focussing on supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement but embedding SAcc in an approach that links the local to the national level to achieve outcomes at scale.

### 6.2 Recommendation 2: Target marginalised groups directly to leave no one behind

In Section 5 above, we conclude that SAcc can deliver against the ambition to leave no one behind if project design specifically targets marginalised groups. Specifically, SAcc platforms that feature gender or other social inclusion criteria are effective in achieving improved results for marginalised groups. Overall, we therefore recommend SAcc initiatives to directly target marginalised groups, backed by clarity in logframe ambition and reporting.

In support of this targeted approach, the ambition of SAcc programmes should get better at identifying and designing interventions for marginalised groups, whether for locally supported SAcc or for more ambitious higher-level processes. It should then be incumbent on programme designers to be more proactive – learning from best practice, trying different mixes of activities – in finding ways to ensure that SAcc interventions leave no one behind.

### 6.3 Recommendation 3: Consider the context, and think and work politically

Our analysis shows that project context influences the effectiveness of SAcc initiatives. For instance, a strong social contract is by itself a strong driver of formal citizen engagement. When there is a weak social contract, formal citizen engagement appears to be less important than informal citizen action, which can be effectively supported via media oversight. However, illustrative evidence found that in other cases, even in the context of a weak social contract

formal citizen engagement may play an important role, which can be best supported through building citizens' knowledge of their entitlements.

While not a specific categorical focus of this evaluation, it is important to note that DFID 'models' of SAcc support vary widely. They include multiple and varied small grantmaking, large grants to high-capacity partner organisations and supply-driven SAcc elements of governance reform programmes. Our analysis found evidence of positive contributions to change across these models. The significant point for DFID operationally is to integrate SAcc contextually, whatever the model of delivery. This means not only that careful context/political economy analysis is crucial when designing a SAcc initiative, but that implementation also requires thinking and working politically to adapt to changing contexts and ensure success.

**Table 6.1: Key takeaways for DFID practitioners**

Key takeaways for DFID practitioners
<p><b>To achieve success at scale</b>, apply a strategic approach to SAcc, focussing on supporting formal (invited) citizen engagement but linking the local to higher levels to achieve outcomes at scale. Tactical approaches that do not ensure vertical integration are likely to achieve only limited and unsustainable improvements.</p> <p><b>Operational checklist:</b><sup>111</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Does the project integrate local SAcc with higher-level policies and processes by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ linking local SAcc with higher-level policy processes that (i) increase entitlements and/or (ii) increase budget allocations</li> <li>✓ building vertical integration linking civil society on-the-ground with higher-level policy discussion by supporting (i) hierarchies of locally supported organisations; and/or (ii) partnerships between CBOs and higher-level CSOs</li> <li>✓ supporting strategic flows of evidence upwards into policy discussions through: (i) longitudinal impact monitoring to ground-truth policy discussions; (ii) shorter-term outcome monitoring; and (iii) lesson learning on SAcc processes for mainstreaming at scale?</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Is there a contextual case for integrating demand and supply at the local level by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ engaging with locally credible and trusted SAcc platforms/processes</li> <li>✓ working through locally credible civil society organisations that act flexibly and with political sensitivity</li> <li>✓ encouraging collaborative relationships between citizens and service providers where possible?</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><b>To leave no one behind</b>, target social inclusion directly through gender and other social inclusion criteria in SAcc mechanisms. SAcc initiatives will not deliver automatically for such groups unless they are explicitly targeted.</p>

<sup>111</sup> These are preliminary suggestions, primarily based on limited illustrative case study evidence.

**Operational checklist:**

- Does the project integrate social inclusion criteria by:
  - ✓ identifying workable measures to ensure meaningful inclusion of socially marginalised voices on local SAcc platforms
  - ✓ tracking contribution of SAcc processes to improved accessibility, quality and relevance of services for socially marginalised groups
  - ✓ integrating social inclusion in SAcc processes within clearly targeted
- Is there a contextual case for complementing SAcc processes with targeted supply-side measures by:
  - ✓ increasing investment in services for marginalised groups?

**To achieve success in different and changing contexts**, conduct careful context analysis and think and work politically to adapt to shifting environments. Different contexts require different SAcc strategies to achieve success, and blueprint approaches that are not responsive to changing contexts are bound to fail.

**Operational checklist:**

- Does the project design and implementation take account of SAcc context by:
  - ✓ linking political economy analysis to the design of SAcc at national and subnational levels
  - ✓ tracking changing political economy context linked to programme learning and adaptation
  - ✓ encouraging project reporting that incentives adaptation and encourages experimentation?
- Is there a contextual case for supporting formal citizen engagement by:
  - ✓ working long-term through existing organisations and networks
  - ✓ engaging through a strong on-the-ground presence?

*Source: Authors*